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ABSTRACT 
A military‘s ability to adapt its organization, doctrine, and technology strategy to 
meet the threats of its time influences the state‘s capacity to maintain great 
power status.  This thesis uses a historical overview of military innovation among 
great powers throughout history to draw lessons for the U.S. military today.  In 
this heuristic analysis, it is determined that great powers that integrated between 
and among their various elements of national power were able to maintain their 
positions better than those that did not.  The study transitions from a descriptive 
to a prescriptive mode, concluding with the caution that, if the U.S. military does 
not begin to transform itself from a Cold War organization to an adaptable, 
resilient force for the future, it could hasten America‘s loss of global power.  
Measures that the U.S. military should take to innovate organizationally, 
doctrinally and in terms of technology strategy are prescribed.  Finally, and most 
importantly, this study finds it essential to foster a climate and institutional culture 
receptive to innovation. 
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This project began with the research question:  how does military innovation 
affect the ability of a country to gain or maintain great power status?  This 
question was predicated on the belief that America‘s status as the global 
superpower was, and will continue to be, challenged by the forces of 
globalization and the rising of power challengers; and that the U.S. military will 
play a key role in this power transition.  In order to analyze this research 
question, a heuristic overview of military innovation by great powers was 
conducted.  This analysis produced the following conclusions.  Vertical and 
horizontal integration of the elements of national power are necessary for power 
maintenance.  The term vertical integration reflects the hierarchical nature of the 
national security structure and proposes that military strategy must support 
national strategy to be truly effective, just as military tactics and operations 
support military strategy.  Horizontal integration encompasses the ideas of 
jointness, interagency, and whole-of-society—referring to the collaborative power 
created by distinct organizations combining their specialties towards a common 
goal.  Great powers that were able to maintain power for the longest periods 
were those that possessed the soft power component and social innovation to 
establish an innovation feedback cycle between the society and the military.  
Vertical integration of this innovation occurred when states were able to establish 
a coherent national strategy that guided this innovation cycle towards a common 
goal and then used the resultant power for the purpose of diplomatic influence.  
Horizontal integration occurred when states achieved appropriate civil-military 
integration and balancing—favoring civilian control and checking militarism—
while also establishing the military-social feedback cycle.  Horizontal integration 
also occurred at the military service level, with those militaries that were able to 
incorporate ground, sea, and air capabilities having the most success in 
maintaining their countries‘ power.   
 x 
Applying these lessons to America today, the paper proposes to increase 
vertical and horizontal integration of U.S. power.  The United States needs a 
national strategy in order to direct military and social innovation toward a specific 
aim, but a strategy alone is not sufficient.  The government must institute forcing 
mechanisms to integrate the elements of national power toward this stated goal.  
Several of the forcing mechanisms proposed are:  transforming the geographical 
combatant commands to civilian-led regional interest directorates; aligning these 
interagency organizations with an interagency Pentagon that is no longer the 
home of the Department of Defense, but the home of an American diplomatic, 
defense, and development interagency process; and pooling funding for 
diplomacy, defense, and development to force integration.  In addition to these 
proposals, this paper posits that the active duty personnel strength of the U.S. 
military should be cut in half.  This personnel cut would acknowledge the 
resource-constrained environment, while maintaining a resilient security posture 
through innovative doctrine, technology, and organizations.  Finally, the 
organization of the U.S. military itself must make structural changes that will 
allow innovative leaders to rise and an innovative organization to flourish.  In 
order to accomplish this, the military must match its personnel cuts with 
organizational changes that flatten the hierarchy and adapt the personnel and 
promotion system to allow innovative leaders to consistently adapt the 
organization to meet future threats.  The U.S. military must embrace the 
opportunities of the information age and the realities of constrained resources.  
The good news is that this can be accomplished while maintaining superior 
capability relative to known competitors and the flexibility to adapt to the 
unknowable threats of the future. 
 xi 
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In 2025, the United States believes that it is still the global hegemon in 
world politics.  After continuing failure of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and 
numerous incursions into Lebanon by Israel to stem Hezbollah attacks, Israel 
faces an existential threat from the combined efforts of Hezbollah, Hamas, and 
Iran.   Hostilities have escalated to the point of brinkmanship crisis between 
nuclear-armed Israel and nuclear-armed Iran.  The United States enters 
negotiations between the two as a self-perceived power broker, but is unable to 
sway Israel and is completely ineffective against an isolated Iran.  Russia and 
China do possess some influence over Iran, but India refrains from input based 
on already-strained relations with other Muslim nations over Kashmir.  There is a 
vote in the United Nations Security Council in which Russia and China veto 
Washington's move to support Israel against Iran, and does not provide the 
mandate for collective action.  This watershed event indicates the fall of America 
from global hegemonic status in the realm of diplomacy.  There is a mismatch 
between how the United States perceives itself and how the world views U.S. 
power.  With a conventionally-focused military and a still-superior nuclear force, 
Washington is limited in its military options, between the unthinkable—
commitment to nuclear retaliation in support of Israel against Iran—and the 
unwieldy—a conventional attack against the territory of Iran.  The U.S. military‘s 
failure to innovatively change its security structure and military to meet the reality 
of the evolving international system has left the country less able to influence 
global affairs.   
The U.S. Department of Defense is an enormous bureaucracy that fosters 
a climate resistant to change.  In its history, only when it is faced with a great 
threat does the organization foster the innovation necessary to meet the 
challenges of the present—much less the future.  Recent efforts at 
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transformation have met more resistance than acceptance,1 but even those goals 
have tended only to attempt to shape the department for the current 
environment.  With a Navy fixated on carrier battle groups, an Air Force wed to 
the idea of aerial bombardment, and an Army that will not accept the dissolution 
of its corps and divisions, despite their mounting costs and debatable 
effectiveness, unabated institutional inertia and risk aversion may reduce the 
U.S. military to an outmoded organization.  As currently configured, the 
Department of Defense will adapt slower to the environment than necessary.  
With the rising power of China, the emerging markets of India and Brazil, the 
unknown future of Russia, and other emerging regional powers and global 
networks, the Department of Defense must begin now to shape itself for a future 
in which the United States‘ dominant military position is likely to be challenged.   
This thesis seeks to answer the question:  how does military innovation 
affect the ability of a country to gain or maintain great power status?  This project 
will analyze great empires and nations throughout history as they gained, 
maintained or lost great power status.  I will then determine the effectiveness, 
timing, and frequency of military innovation in each of these ascending, 
maintaining, or failing great powers to determine a causal relationship between 
military innovation and the great power status.  In certain cases, I expect to find 
that military innovation directly led to the great power status of a country (e.g., 
Sweden‘s rise in 1630).  While in other circumstances, it will be system structure 
that prompted military innovation.  In many instances, other factors, such as 
economic, diplomatic, and/or informational innovation, may prove more causally 
significant to great power status than military innovation.  This last phenomenon 
may also yield a trend regarding the overall importance of military might, with 
respect to other factors over time.  This trend will provide insight into two key 
variables of great power status:  the level of civil-military integration and the 
presence or absence of a social-military innovation feedback loop.  This heuristic 
                                            
1  John Arquilla, Worst Enemy:  The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008), passim.  
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analysis of military innovation will focus on the first two cases—where military 
innovation, or lack thereof, directly caused the ascendency, maintenance, or loss 
of great power status, and where the great power structure forced military 
innovation.  Both of these causal relationships are significant for the prescriptive 
portion at the end of the thesis.  The study will be limited to the  ‗threshold of 
great power status,‘ which is only the countries that enter, maintain, or leave that 
select group of powers considered ‗great.‘  In the modern era, this select group is 
codified by historians and political scientists; in the ancient and medieval era, I 
have selected powers that are commonly considered ‗great‘ by most historians.  
In an attempt to be as objective as possible in this selection, while limiting the 
scope of study to a useful length, I have erred on the side of selecting powers 
that maintained power over a longer period of time.  This focus on maintenance 
of power directly relates to the lessons I tried to draw for maintaining U.S. global 
power.   
Military innovation is defined as changing the organization, doctrine, 
and/or technology of the military.  I will discuss the translation of ideas into action 
that include both imitative and inventive ideas, and how they are implemented.  
Effective innovation is defined as that type of change that is tested and proven in 
battle to be positive change.  This will help differentiate effective innovation from 
ineffective innovation (such as the Maginot Line).  Throughout history, there are 
also several cases of military revolutions and military transformations.  Both of 
these concepts are considered parts of the overall trend of military innovation—
revolutions denoting specific periods when innovation occurred and diffused 
rapidly, and transformations taking place when militaries adapted their 
organizations to maximize innovations in technology, doctrine, or both. 
This thesis will use a heuristic approach to analyze military innovation‘s 
relationship to great power status throughout history.  The framework will be built 
on the realist school of international relations, but will also rely on power 
transition theory and long cycle theory. Instead of specific case-study analysis, 
the intended approach will show military innovations throughout history, and how 
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they affected, or failed to affect, a country‘s great power status.  In the second 
part of the thesis, there is a shift from a descriptive to prescriptive format.  Using 
an interdisciplinary approach founded on organizational theory (structure, 
technology, and doctrine), and the lessons derived from Part I, it will propose 
what actions DoD might take today to meet the challenges of the future, and 
maintain the United States‘ great power status. 
The prescriptive portion of this paper is based on the belief that this is truly 
a period in history like no other.  However, it is also based in the belief that 
history is replete with periods ‗like no other,‘ when the social, economic and 
political forces of change created periods of chaos for which there was no 
historical precedent.  The lessons of past periods of chaos may hold some 
kernels of knowledge for the current ‗sand pile,‘2 while they should always be 
judged with the understanding that their application will not be direct or a 
panacea—they must be placed in the current context and adapted to realities of 





                                            
2 Joshua Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable:  Why the New World Disorder Constantly 
Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It (New York:  Little, Brown and Co., 2009), passim. 
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II. MILITARY INNOVATION IN THE RISE AND FALL OF GREAT 
POWERS  
A well-equipped and organized armed force, making contact with a 
society not equally well organized for war, acts in much the same 
way as the germs of a disease-experienced society do.  The 
weaker community, in such an encounter, may suffer heavy loss of 
life in combat.  More often it suffers its principal losses from 
exposure to economic and epidemiological invasions that are made 
possible by the military superiority of the stronger people.  But 
whatever the exact combination of factors, a society unable to 
protect itself by force from foreign molestation loses its autonomy 
and may lose its corporate identity as well.3 
A. ANCIENT TIMES:  DID MIGHT MAKE RIGHT? 
Thinking about the earliest military innovation may well lead to drawing the 
most prescient lessons for modern military innovators.  Although relatively little is 
truly known about the ancient period in human history, warfare and battle are 
known to have played an important role in the development of civilizations and in 
their interactions with one another.  This period was unique in history—as 
civilizations grew and came into contact with other previously unknown 
civilizations, the first concepts of power and warfare came into being.  As each 
civilization adapted its use of force either to gain power or to survive, history 
witnessed the first innovation in doctrine—from warring mobs to military 
organizations based on mass.  In the organizational realm, the first moves were 
made in ancient times toward establishing a standing force for protection of the 
society—an innovation that continued professionalization of militaries throughout 
history.  Finally, technological innovations played a significant role in this era, as 
the chariot was invented, imitated, and employed to varying degrees of success 
along with bronze and iron weaponry.  The case of the chariot provides an 
excellent example of a trend in technological innovation that persists throughout 
history.  Of the three types of innovations, technological ones are both the 
                                            
3 William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1982), viii. 
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hardest to define as innovations and the easiest to imitate.  New technologies are 
inventions, and only become military innovations when they are incorporated with 
innovative doctrines and organizational designs that maximize their use.  As 
inventions, they are also the easiest for an enemy to imitate.  Throughout history, 
numerous examples of technological imitation occur, but only when the 
technology is adapted into doctrinal and organizational innovations is it truly 
decisive.  The Mycenaean use of the chariot as contrasted with the Egyptians in 
ancient times, and the German use of the tank as contrasted to the French in 
World War II are only two among countless examples. 
1. Ancient Egypt (3100 BC–1069 BC) 
Ancient Egypt attributed much of its power to the art, writing, and 
construction that made it a civilization like no other.4  Geographical barriers to the 
east and west provided it a level of protection from invaders, and a predictably 
flooding river valley provided for fertile agricultural areas.  As the earliest 
coherent civilization, Egypt first fought internal wars for establishment and 
consolidation of power, which were more ceremonial in nature than later external 
wars.5  When external threats did present themselves, first from the south then 
later from the ‗sea peoples‘ of the Mediterranean, the organization and 
administration provided by an innovative society allowed Egyptian militaries to 
defeat their attackers and preserve their territory and civilization.   
The technological innovation of chariots and the organizational innovation 
of a standing military force helped maintain Egyptian power for over two 
thousand years.  Partially due to the gold acquired from Nubia, coupled with the 
superior level of development of Egyptian society relative to its contemporaries, 
Egyptian leaders were able to hire skilled artisans who crafted chariots, and then 
employed them properly in battle.  The skills required to drive the chariots and 
                                            
4 This cultural power based on the ability of a civilization to influence another, will be called 
‗soft power‘ throughout this paper.  It is contrasted with the ‗hard power‘ of military capability used 
to influence.  See Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 
5 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), 132. 
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fire a bow from a moving platform required extensive training.  This human 
capital investment in training and technology forced a certain professionalization 
of the military.  This professionalization resulted from the fact that charioteers 
had to maintain training in order to be effective and chariots were, for their time, 
expensive technology.  Therefore, skilled charioteers moved into fortified areas, 
and out of the general society from which they came.  This professionalization 
also gave them a distinct advantage over barbarian forces—standing, trained 
forces were able to respond to threats quicker than barbarian attackers who had 
to raise and mobilize forces before conducting military actions.6   The same 
organizational advantage would help maintain the power of the Roman Empire 
more than a millennium later.  In this way, the Egyptians were able to adopt a 
technological innovation and adapt their military organization and doctrine to 
maximize its effectiveness.  The doctrinal and organizational innovation is what 
separated the Egyptian military from the militaries of its contemporaries.  As an 
example of this superiority, the Mycenaeans of the same period used chariots 
only to ride into battle.  They failed to incorporate the advantage of its mobility 
with the firepower of the bow in order to capitalize on both its maneuver and 
psychological advantage.7  As contrasted with the Mycenaeans, who adopted the 
technology, but never adapted tactics to maximize its use, the Egyptians fused 
the technology with appropriate doctrine and organization.   
For a brief period in ancient military history, the emergence of iron 
weaponry led to a democratization of fighting and an overthrow of the ruling 
elites, as the common farmer was able to find iron and make his own weapons. 8   
However, rulers soon regained the upper hand in the use of force and society as 
the value of an organized, professionalized military force over armed mobs 
                                            
6 William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1963), 119. 
7 McNeill, Pursuit of Power, 10. 
8 In the time of bronze weaponry, the expense and artistic capability required to form these 
metals into weapons and armor kept fighting securely in the realm of kings.  With the advent of 
iron weapons—a substance more readily found in nature and more easily formed into weaponry, 
a certain democratization of fighting took place.  McNeill, Pursuit of Power, 12. 
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became evident.  A re-consolidation of power took place as rulers alone retained 
enough wealth to establish and maintain the administration to support these 
forces.9  The trend of democratization and reconsolidation of force continues 
throughout the historical study military innovation.  
In Ancient Egypt, the technological innovations of chariots and iron 
weaponry changed the face of warfare.  However, ultimate power lay in the 
hands of the Egyptian rulers who were able to maximize the use of the chariots 
through doctrinal and organizational innovation and establish the administration 
to support a professional military organization.  Therefore, the combination of 
technological, doctrinal and organizational innovation proved most decisive in 
maintaining the first great power in history.  This military innovation supported, 
and resulted from, the flourishing of societal innovation in art, writing, and 
construction, as the military adapted and professionalized to protect its 
civilization from external threats.  Analysis of this first great power suggests a 
trend that will develop throughout history—military innovation as a part of a larger 
feedback loop with societal, political and economic innovation.  
2. The Akkadian Empire (2334 BC–2154 BC) 
Although the history of warfare does not begin with the Akkadian Empire, 
this period does mark the ―intensification of combat to the point where we can 
begin to speak of it as ‗battle‘‖.10  The Akkadian Empire established itself on the 
foundation of the Sumerian civilization, as far as historians can tell.  The 
geography in which the Sumerian, and later Akkadian, people lived is as 
responsible for their rapid and frequent military innovation as the geography of 
Egypt was responsible for the Egyptians relatively little need to innovate.  The 
Sumerian civilization began to take form in Mesopotamia—an area devoid of the 
natural geographic boundaries which protected the Egyptians.  Consequently,  
 
                                            
9 McNeill, Pursuit of Power, 13. 
10 Keegan, History of Warfare, 133. 
 9 
the Sumerians fought frequently both within their own society and to protect it 
from outsiders.  This consistent threat created an environment that necessitated 
military innovation. 
Some historians believe that the Sumerians, rather than the Greeks, 
created the phalanx battle formation.11  This idea derives from the discovery of a 
limestone monument called the ―Stele of Vultures,‖ which dates to the Sumerian 
time and depicts soldiers moving in a phalanx formation.12  However, the 
doctrinal and organizational innovation of the phalanx was lost in military history 
because it met with a technological innovation that defeated it in battle and broke 
its historical lineage.  This technological innovation was the Akkadian use of the 
bow.  Sargon, who became ruler of the Akkadian Empire, employed the bow in 
battle to defeat the Sumerian phalanx.13  With the defeat of the Sumerians, and 
the establishment of a Semite-led military under Sargon, the phalanx was lost as 
an organizational and doctrinal innovation until the Greeks reinvented it 2,000 
years later. 
The Akkadian Empire is interesting in contrast to Egyptian civilization.  By 
virtue of geography, the Sumerian peoples faced constant threats from all 
directions, and developed an organizational innovation resembling the phalanx to 
meet these threats.  Their organizational innovation may provide the first 
historical example of recognizable battle, as opposed to individual or group 
warfare.  The societal innovations in agriculture and art were able to flourish 
under the protection of this first battle formation. However, organization 
innovation by itself proved insufficient.  When faced with a technologically 
superior force, employing the bow, the Sumerian people met defeat at the hands 
of an organizationally inferior force under Sargon.  As is often the case in history, 
Sargon, subsumed the societal advances made by the Sumerians and combined 
                                            
11 Robert O‘Connell, Of Arms and Men (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1989), 36. 
12 That the organizational innovation of the phalanx is often credited to the Greeks, instead 
of the Sumerians, is an example of how innovation is non-linear, and how one innovation may 
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them with a strong military force.  With the benefit of the advances of the 
Sumerian civilization, Sargon then turned his conquering armies outward to 
establish the Akkadian Empire—the first known empire in history. 
3.   The Assyrians (934 BC–605 BC) 
―The history of Assyria is the history of war.‖14  The Assyrian Empire was 
martial, focused more for the sake of gaining power than the protection of the 
civilized society.  Regardless of the purposes to which military innovation was 
put, one has to give credit to both the success and the persistence of those 
innovations.  The Assyrian militarily innovated in all three realms—organization, 
doctrine, and technology—to sustain an empire for over seven centuries, despite 
being mistrusted by its neighbors and under constant attack. 
Assyrian rulers first established a parallel administrative system that 
facilitated taxation of their subjects to support the military.  Although this is not a 
directly military innovation, the fact that the Assyrians translated this 
administrative organization into real military power shows the interconnectedness 
of administration and military might, even in ancient times.  They also notably 
invented the concept of military rank.  The first organized military formations 
formed in units of ten and, for the first time in history, clearly delineated who 
should lead and who should follow.15  Later this organizational innovation 
allowed the Assyrians to adapt the bow to a new doctrinal innovation for fighting:  
massed volley fire.    Up until this time, bowmen were skirmishers or fought as 
separate groups.  The Assyrians realized the doctrinal advantage of massed bow 
fires and grouped their bowman behind foot soldiers with shields and spears to 
protect them.  In this way, the Assyrians pioneered the first doctrine of combined 
arms fighting.16  As proof of its doctrinal innovativeness, Gustavus Adolphus of 
Sweden would revive this technique in the seventeenth century by integrating 
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massed volley fire with protective ranks of combined arms.  Also in the realm of 
doctrine, the Assyrians realized that chariots provided a psychological advantage 
in battle, but were of little use it actual fighting.  Therefore, the Assyrians first 
combined man and horse with a bow as a fighting mechanism.  The inventive 
and martial nature of the Assyrian Empire allowed its people to develop, 
relatively quickly, the first concept of armored cavalry and the ancient armored 
division.  This doctrinal military concept spawned numerous technological 
innovations to support it and to further its usefulness. 
In order to allow the establishment of armored cavalry as a main 
organizing principle for the Assyrian military, two non-military, technological 
innovations took place.  First, the Assyrians had to breed horses large enough to 
support an armored rider.  In addition, the Assyrians began growing alfalfa to 
feed the horses, so that, for the first time, crops were grown specifically for the 
efficient feeding of horses and did not compete with the crops grown for human 
consumption.17  These societal innovations allowed military doctrinal innovations 
such as armored cavalry and further technological innovations, such as the siege 
train.  Armored cavalry was similar in many ways to the innovation of the chariot.  
It changed the social dynamic of the military because, like the chariot, it required 
both resources to acquire and skill to conduct.  In this way, it brought power to 
those who could exploit its use.18  This shift also had ramifications for the society 
from which the military came.  The larger horses and expense of the specialized 
rider were costs translated to society in the form of taxes under the Assyrian 
administrative system.  In fortified cities, where agricultural area was scarce, 
societies did not employ armored cavalry; whereas, the frontier lands saw their 
value grow into a full-fledged feudal system.  In this way, the development of 
armored cavalry was uneven across the Assyrian Empire, with a feudal system  
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developing in the frontier areas, completely separate from the social structure of 
the cities.  This social divergence due to military innovation highlights some of its 
unintended negative consequences.   
The Assyrian Empire fell surprisingly quickly to an alliance between the 
Scythians, the Medes, and the Babylonians, which joined to defeat the former at 
Nineveh in 605 BCE.19  The power of the Assyrian Empire passed first to the 
Babylonians, in due time defeated by the Persians.  It is interesting to note that 
the Persians seem to show little military innovation, but rather assumed the 
innovations of the conquered Assyrians.  The Persian King Xerxes, over a 
century later, applied the Assyrian model of taxation to a new logistical method 
that may have sustained the empire in the short term.  Xerxes used a food 
taxation system to create stores of food for both men and horses along his 
army‘s line of march.20  This had the effect of both speeding the movement of the 
army, because they did not have to stop and plunder, and may have maintained 
some level of popular support for the military campaigns.  For the first time, 
populations in the path of advancing militaries were not the subject of plundering 
by the army.  Although this logistical innovation is admirable, the Persians only 
enhanced their ability to get to the field of battle more quickly with obsolete 
technology and doctrine.  The innovations of the Greeks in organization and 
doctrine would prove fatal to the Persian charioteers and armored cavalry.  As 
with the Akkadians, the Persian example proves that innovation must occur 
across the realms of organization, doctrine and technology to prove truly effective 
in power maintenance.  One type of innovation, or the assumption of another 
civilization‘s innovation with no continuance of the cycle, will not sustain an 
empire‘s power. 
The Assyrian Empire provides excellent examples of military innovations, 
but also highlights the limitations and potential downfalls of some of those 
innovations.  Often portrayed in history as barbaric, tyrannical people, the 
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Assyrians, nonetheless, fostered an innovative spirit in their society and military.  
Assyrians created two efficient systems—an administrative one and a military 
one—which supported and protected each other.  The administrative system 
provided a revenue stream through taxation to support the military.  The military 
innovated and adapted its doctrine and organization to protect and expand its 
territory.  The use of combined arms in the form of massed bowmen protected by 
shields and spears, and the evolution of chariots into armored cavalry allowed 
the Assyrians to maintain and expand an empire larger than any before.  The 
paradox in the Assyrian case is that while this great power first consciously 
merged social and military innovation in a symbiotic cycle, it was unable to create 
the soft power capability to sustain its civilization.  Technological innovations in 
society, such as larger horse breeding, alfalfa cultivation, and taxation directly 
supported the military power of the empire, but did not translate to creating a 
society that others wanted to emulate. 
Hegemonic power based almost exclusively on military might tends to be 
self-defeating.21  Despite the Assyrian‘s ability to innovate technologically, 
organizationally, and doctrinally, the absence of a ‗greater‘ society and civilization 
to protect proved ultimately fatal for the empire.  Because the empire‘s enemies 
were able to imitate the inventions of the Assyrian‘s, and employ these 
innovations to defeat their innovator, the Assyrian Empire fell to its own initial 
innovativeness and inability to main that process.  The diffusion of technological 
and doctrinal innovation—in the form of armored cavalry tactics to peoples more 
accustomed to riding horses and the feudal system that resulted from frontier 
employment of armored cavalry—are examples of the unintended consequences 
and potential downfalls of innovation.  In addition, there exists a lesson that an 
empire that exists solely to support its military is doomed to failure.  Military 
innovation, copied by enemies and turned against the innovator, can prove fatal 
through the phenomenon of diffusion.  This lesson has two implications for great 
powers—that innovation is a continual cycle and that military innovation is always 
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relative to the innovation of your enemies.  The Persians did not appreciate these 
lessons to the detriment of their empire.  For a great power to maintain that 
status, it must compel not only further innovation in society and the military, but 
also outpace the military innovations of its enemies. 
4.   The Greeks (776 BC–323 BC) 
Early Greece is a microcosm of the ancient period as a whole.  The city-
states of Athens and Sparta present a contrast much as the one described above 
between Egypt and Assyria.  Athens represents the beginning of western 
civilization, with the flourishing of art, literature, and democracy.  The Athenian 
military‘s raison d’être was to protect the civilization and expand its soft power 
influence, much as the Egyptian military had done.  By contrast, the Spartans 
were a martial people much like the Assyrians; military power was an end to itself 
in Sparta, as it was in Assyria.  The primary purpose of military power in Sparta 
was to protect from internal, rather than external threats—the military system was 
designed to keep the helots under control.  The Peloponnesian Wars between 
these two city-states resulted in Sparta briefly taking power, but the soft power of 
Athenian ideas persisted through the time of Alexander and beyond.  Two 
military innovations of the time, the phalanx on land and the triremes at sea, 
reflect their divergent political structures and level of military preeminence in that 
structure.   
The phalanx, created and then lost by the Sumerians, would become both 
the symbol of and a catalyst for social change in, the Greek city-state.  The well-
armed and well-drilled phalanxes were able to overrun armored cavalry and 
disorganized infantry on the field of battle, and directly represented the power of 
the city-state.  As with the creation of iron weaponry, the heavy infantry of the 
phalanx represented a democratization of fighting and a reorganization of the 
social strata in ancient Greece.  No longer were aristocrats able to monopolize 
the use of violence due to the wealth required to support armies.  With the advent 
of the phalanx, and the hoplite soldier who comprised it, men were more valued 
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for their strength and power than for their wealth and intellect.22  Power on the 
battlefield translated to power in society, as farmer-hoplites were able to take a 
direct role in the election of magistrates and the governance of the city-states.  
As the farmer-hoplites consolidated this power, and threatened to form an 
aristocracy of their own based on land-ownership, another technological military 
innovation again changed the structure of society and the history of Greece. 
The greatest technological innovation of this period was the application of 
warships to the doctrine of seapower by the city-states of Athens, Sparta and 
Corinth.23  As seafaring civilizations, it was a natural course that the Greek 
peoples would extend this essence of their civilization into the field of warfare.  
With the Persians to the east, as a great power with significant naval capability, 
the motivation for innovation in this technology was high.  Although the precise 
time and location of the trireme invention is unknown, Athens and Sparta were 
among the first Greek powers to build significant seafaring military capability.  
The trireme ships transformed phalanx doctrine into sea fighting tactics by using 
these warships to either ram other ships or transport phalanx formations.  The 
smaller and more manageable Greek ships were able to outmaneuver the 
Persian ships—who had innovated towards largeness.  In the same way that 
drilled hoplites formed a successful phalanx, rowers acting in unison were the 
engine of a trireme.  The social effect of this technological and doctrinal 
innovation is the first creation of a respected social class for non-land owners.  
As hoplite-farmers threatened to consolidate power into the hands of landowners, 
the invention of triremes, and the subsequent establishment of an equal social 
class for their rowers, maintained the path towards democracy in these city-
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states.24  The contrast between the Athenian and Spartan understandings of this 
democracy places the military innovations of the phalanx and the trireme in their 
social context. 
Athenians and Spartans understood the phalanx, and later the trireme, to 
be symbolic of their power.  However, the Athenians believed these two military 
tools to be a means to its ultimate power, while the Spartans believed them to be 
the power itself.  The divergent paths the two city-states take upon adoption of 
the innovations reflected these beliefs.  Spartans formed a militaristic society that 
suppressed the enslaved helots, through an otherwise egalitarian outlook.  Every 
able-bodied person took part in the defense of the city-states, with males trained 
in fighting and military tactics from early childhood.  The Spartan hoplite-farmers 
maintained an agricultural base that precluded the need for trade and industry, 
thereby maintaining a limited democracy centered on the military establishment.  
Athens, by contrast, continued its trade and industrial production, which led to the 
rise of a merchant and artisan class alongside the military one.  These rising 
social classes in Athens caused significant political turmoil, but ultimately, 
produced a more stable form of democracy.  These examples highlight not only 
the social effects of military innovation, but also how similar innovations can lead 
to drastically different social effects when placed in context of the political 
character of the state.   
Even though Thebes is rarely considered a great power, in the persistent 
power term, it produced one of the most doctrinally innovation military leaders of 
the ancient period, Epaminondas.  This Theban leader was a pioneer in 
maneuver warfare—continuing the evolution from armed mobs through the mass 
of the phalanx to the power of maneuvering against an enemy to give a marked 
advantage.  Epaminondas first explored this technique by reinforcing his left wing 
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with his best men at the battle of Leuctra.  In this seemingly simple adjustment of 
the classic phalanx, Epaminondas was able to crush the enemy phalanx on its 
weak flank, and the flank on which its leader stood.25  In this way, he not only 
maneuvered, but also did so against the Spartan‘s ‗center of gravity.‘  This tactic 
was made famous by Frederick II of Prussia as the ‗oblique order‘ centuries later, 
but was first pioneered by Epaminondas.  However, the battle of Leuctra was not 
Epaminondas‘ only military innovation.  He also successfully employed deception 
against the Spartans at the tactical and strategic level.  On attacking Spartan 
territory—itself a first in the history of the city-state—Epaminondas made surprise 
night maneuvers to keep the Spartans off balance, which culminated in the battle 
of Mantinea.  In this battle, Epaminondas had a front rank of infantry appear to be 
laying down arms to make camp for the night, causing the Spartans to do the 
same—only to surprise the latter with a full attack.26  In the strategic and grand 
strategic realms, Epaminondas was no less of an innovator.  He used a Fabian 
strategy, of the sort later employed by George Washington in the American 
Revolution, to allow his forces enough time to build strength.  He also employed 
a grand strategy of exploiting dissension within the Spartan ranks to cause 
defections of their enslaved helots.  In this way, Epaminondas was integral in the 
downfall of Sparta.  It is only due to the rise of prominence of Alexander the 
Great, twenty years after the death of Epaminondas in battle, that the latter is not 
more revered in common history.  
Any chapter of Greek military innovation would not be complete without a 
discussion of Alexander.  What is notable in the numerous histories of this great 
military leader is that Alexander created little technological or doctrinal 
innovation.  Instead, he assumed the innovations of the Athenians and Spartans, 
and combined it with charismatic leadership.  Similar to the Persian adoption of 
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Assyrian innovation, the Macedonians adopted many of the Greek innovations. 27  
Alexander‘s father, King Philip of Macedonia, fashioned his military on the Greek 
phalanx concept, but armed his hoplites with a longer spear in order to give them 
longer reach.  Philip combined the phalanx concept with a traditional cavalry 
force.  In this way, King Philip both borrowed and improved upon Greek military 
doctrine, technology, and organization.28  Philip, using their own innovations 
adapted and turned against them, conquered the Athenians and Spartans.  ―As a 
tactician, Alexander‘s greatest asset was the army he inherited from his father.‖29  
Upon inheritance of an able military force and a consolidated Greek mainland 
from his father, Alexander was able to expand this empire to the largest power 
the world had known.   
Alexander‘s greatest innovations were in the organizational and political 
realms.  Using the inherited innovations of the Greeks, Alexander pushed south 
into Persia and east, into the heart of Asia, adapting and reorganizing his force 
as he went.  He expanded the concept of combined arms by coupling the light 
and heavy foot soldiers with varied missile soldiers—bowmen, javelins and 
slingers.  He also integrated the populations that he conquered to create mixed 
ethnicity fighting units.30  As he rapidly expanded his empire, his ethnically 
diversified units allowed Alexander to maintain huge fighting forces with little fear 
of a particular ethnicity pursuing a coup.  A student of Aristotle‘s, Alexander 
combined his learned political acumen with a military instinct for quick and proper 
decisions, an ability to inspire his troops to victory, and the ruthlessness to 
pursue his enemies to their destruction.  In the political realm, Alexander 
understood, better than any of his contemporaries, and possibly better than most 
‗great captains‘ of history that military power was only one component of the 
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state.  His aim in battle was conquest of the territory, not revenge upon the 
people or spoliation of their land.31  This understanding guided military actions 
that always sought to co-opt the people of a conquered territory and prevent its 
destruction.  This subjugation of military power to political aim allowed Alexander 
to create the largest empire in history, and holds particular lessons for modern 
American military leaders.  Rather than a great military innovator in history, 
Alexander presents a case of a skillful and charismatic leader who inherits a 
dominant military to expand his empire‘s power to hitherto unbelievable 
distances. 
5.   Carthage (650 BC–146 BC) 
Although little is known about the establishment of Carthage, it is clear 
that by the sixth century BC their empire extended across North Africa from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Middle East.  Carthage was a loose confederation of cities 
and tribal areas controlled by a senate similar to the Roman government system, 
but distinct in some very important ways.  The Carthaginian system was built on 
tributes paid by conquered areas rather than assumption of these areas into the 
empire, as the Roman system did.  Because of the wealth that these tributes 
created, Carthage was able to pay mercenary armies rather than use armies 
raised from its territorial holdings.32  At its heart, Carthage was a maritime power, 
with its territory stretching across the Mediterranean and its advanced ship 
building resources evident by the First Punic War.  This maritime focus also 
explains its early civilizations on the island of Sicily.33 
As a maritime power, historians believe that Carthage made the first 
technical innovations in warship development.  The Roman triremes discussed 
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below were modeled on a captured Carthaginian warship.34  Carthaginian naval 
doctrine primarily relied on ramming techniques to attack other warships—a 
doctrine which caused the Romans to innovate the corvus.  This technological 
‗innovation race‘ continued throughout the Punic Wars.  The Carthaginians, in the 
Third Punic War, used smaller escort boats to attack the oars and the hulls of the 
Roman triremes, which by that time had become more numerous and better 
manned than the original Carthaginian innovators‘.   
On land, more is known about Carthaginian military innovation.  In the 
realm of technological innovation, the Carthaginians used elephants in battle.  
The huge beasts primarily provided a psychological advantage to the 
Carthaginians, but also proved advantageous in breaking the lines of the massed 
army formations used at the time.  Outside of this technical innovation, little is 
known of Carthaginian weapons development, other than the assumption that it 
was inferior to that of the Romans‘.  This assumption is based on the account 
that Hannibal used battlefield recovery of Roman weapons after the battle of 
Lake Trasimene.  The Carthaginians also employed mercenaries according to 
their own strength, such as the Numidians, a tribal people accustomed to 
horseback riding, were formed into light cavalry—an integral part of Hannibal‘s 
army. 35 
The greatest innovation attributed to the Carthaginians is doctrinal.  The 
brothers Hannibal and Hasdrubal possessed, ―powers of leadership and tactical 
innovation [that] transcended the limitation which the mercenary character of 
their soldiers imposed on their capacity to operate at long range from base.‖36  At 
Cannae, the Roman commander Varro deployed his infantry in the center with 
cavalry on each flank—the traditional battle formation at the time.  Hannibal left 
his center weak to bow when the Romans attacked, but massed infantry on each 
flank that quickly encircled the Romans.  The maneuver proved to be a massacre 
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for the Roman legions on the field.37  In an interesting twist on the diffusion of 
innovation—especially fluid in doctrinal innovation—the Roman commander 
Scipio, would use Hannibal‘s new tactic to defeat a Carthaginian force in Spain in 
the same war.   
Imperial overstretch accounts for the destruction of Carthage, like so many 
empires in history.  Hannibal‘s conquest to the gates of Rome forever poisoned 
the relationship between these two powers, and embittered Roman leaders such 
as Cato, to forever seek the destruction of Carthage.  Following the Battle of 
Zama, the Roman Empire extended somewhat lenient peace terms to Carthage, 
but many in the Roman Senate looked enviably upon the commercial 
revitalization of Carthage.38  After the expiration of the peace treaty, Rome, in 
need of resources and vengeance, finally repaid its perceived debt to Carthage.  
In the Third Punic War the now-dominant Roman Empire destroyed the city of 
Carthage and the Carthaginian Empire. 
6. The Roman Empire (290 BC–476 AD) 
The Roman Empire, like all great powers in history, was the culmination of 
a complex story that caused a state to rise above the power of its neighbors, and 
occasionally the ecumene, and then dissolved as other powers rose.  An 
adequate starting point for the story of the Roman Empire is 390 BC.  In that 
year, the Gauls from the north sacked the city of Rome and forever influenced 
the psyche of Romans.  For the next century, the Romans would transform their 
legions into the most feared fighting force in the world.39  The Roman Empire 
emerged from the first two Punic Wars in the form of a consolidated Italian 
peninsula.  The political consolidation of the peninsula was relatively easy due to 
a lack of the city-state-like ties that existed in Greece.  The Italians had many 
more cross-cutting ties based on family, religion, and military affiliation, which 
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allowed easy assimilation into a unified Rome.  They were also a hardy peasant 
stock that, when formed, became the greatest military asset of the empire.40  The 
Roman Empire‘s military strength was built on the foundation of a system that 
placed preeminence on bravery in battle and transformed hardy peasant stock 
into battlefield heroes.  The military system accomplished this through a triad of 
ferocity, skill and logistics that ensured battlefield bravery was present at the right 
time to defeat its opponents.41  Its military leaders built upon this solid foundation 
with methodological tactics, which avoided surprise and fortified their line of 
march, rather than risk losing control of a quickly advancing force.42   
The military of the Roman Empire innovated in the technological, 
organizational and doctrinal realms to maximize the effectiveness of its most 
precious resource—its legionnaires.  In the technological realm, Roman naval 
leaders developed the corvus.  This droppable bridge allowed Roman ships to 
fasten their enemy‘s ship to their own, in order to board with legionnaires that 
could defeat the enemy in close combat.  With this technology, the Romans were 
able to negate the naval superiority of the Carthaginians, by utilizing their 
greatest strength in an unconventional method.  In the organizational realm of 
innovation, the Romans made more significant and long-lasting impacts.   The 
establishment of the legions and the Marian reforms that shaped them, led to a 
professionalization of the military force that persisted through history.43  The first 
step in professionalization was the dropping of the requirement for property 
ownership as a qualification for military service.  This established the first ‗all-
volunteer force‘ as every citizen was eligible for service.  The second Marian 
reform presented each legion with an aquila.  This early ‗guidon‘ gave each 
legion its own symbol of unity and led to a sense of espirt de corps.44  In the 
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siege of the Etruscan city of Veii, a Roman leader institutes, for the first time, 
regular pay for soldiers.  Leaders from the time of ancient Egypt had realized the 
value of standing, trained militaries, and the Assyrians had pioneered the 
establishment of an administration to support military activities.  Before the 
Romans, however, no army in history had established a system of regular pay 
that would truly professionalize the service of arms.  This concept would 
transform the idea of protection of the state from citizen-militias to a force that is 
paid by the state.45  It also had dramatic social implications, as the 
professionalized military system allowed the development of garrisons, armories 
and regular pay based on rank.  This coupling of pay with a rank structure 
created a parallel social structure to the society it protected.  Roman officers 
were able to have families, live on property and own slaves because of this 
system.  Serving in the military became a profession rather than a complete life 
commitment or a part-time citizen duty.46  These organizational innovations—the 
establishment of a professionalized legion and their subdivision in maniples, 
facilitated the doctrinal innovation of maneuver warfare. 
After suffering defeat at Cannae, at the hands of Hannibal, the Romans 
learned the doctrinal innovation of maneuver and employed it to defeat their one-
time conqueror.  In Spain, Scipio first employed the same doctrinal innovation 
Hannibal used at Cannae against the Carthaginians.  The ‗weak middle‘ 
formation developed by Hannibal defeated the Carthaginian army and, coupled 
with Roman seapower, allowed Scipio to move into Africa.47  This new threat 
caused Carthage to call Hannibal home and set the stage for the Battle of Zama.  
At the battle of Zama in 202 BC, the Roman leader Scipio further advanced the 
concept of maneuver warfare to progress the innovation begun by Epaminondas 
two hundred years earlier.  Employing his maniples one behind the other, rather 
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than the checkerboard formation that they traditionally deployed in, and then 
masking this formation with skirmishers, Scipio was able to absorb the initial 
onslaught of Hannibal‘s elephants as they passed straight through his lines.48  
Scipio‘s ability to assume the innovations of Hannibal from Cannae for success in 
Spain, but then continue to innovate his doctrine to maximize his strength and 
minimize the impact of Hannibal‘s elephants at Zama, mark him as a great 
doctrinal innovator in history. 
Possibly the greatest achievement of the Roman military was not the 
organization of the legions or the technology of its professionalized force, but the 
use of military power for psychological persuasion.  Long before Clausewitz, the 
Romans understood that military power supports political purposes, and often the 
best use of military power was in the threat of force.49  Much as the Chinese 
civilian leadership used demonstrated military capability to affect coercive 
diplomacy, so did the Romans employ this concept.  The difference in the Roman 
case is that there is evidence that this understanding pervaded the military from 
the strategic to the tactical level.50  One of the best examples of the Roman use 
of psychological operations was the siege of Masada.  Instead of starving out the 
isolated Jewish fighters, or attacking them directly, the Roman legion took three 
years to build a ramp to the top of the plateau in order to defeat the holdouts.  
This engineering feat served as a symbol to the people of the Levant, and the 
ecumene, that the Roman Empire would pursue revolutionaries to the top of any 
mountain to wipe them out.51 
There were three distinct phases in the Roman Empire‘s strategy. 52  The 
first phase was expansion of the empire to satisfy those who held power in 
Rome.  The second phase was a softening of the core‘s views towards the client 
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states in the empire and a Romanization of the conquered peoples.  The military 
in this phase moved from the center to the outlying areas to protect the empire 
along its borders.  The third phase marked the beginning of decline:  when the 
military moved from the empire‘s borders towards the center to establish a 
defense in depth.  This last phase engendered unintended consequences—the 
client states of the empire, without the physical protection of the legions, began 
to question whether the taxes required by the empire were worth the protection 
being afforded.  ―The great economy of force that made the unitary empire a 
most efficient provider of security is lost.‖53 The outputs by the empire were equal 
to the inputs by the client states.  When this occurred, an enemy who offered a 
better equation could win over the client state.  Although the civilian and military 
leadership of the early Roman Empire understood and employed psychological 
operations and coercive diplomacy effectively, later leaders seemed to forget this 
lesson.  The breakdown of political-military integration—in this case, the 
demonstrated military capacity in client states in order to justify the political costs 
of taxation—led to the downfall of the empire.54 
The Roman Empire offers some of the most prescient lessons for modern 
great powers, and the United States in particular.  The Roman legions‘ ability to 
build infrastructure as it expanded its territory, and later to offer citizenship to 
those it conquered, successfully coupled soft and hard power to sustain the 
empire for centuries.  Skillful politicians also used the reputation of the awe-
inspiring legions to conduct diplomacy and coerce favorable political relationships 
for the empire.  The military employed this psychological effect, as well.  The 
construction of a ramp to the top of Masada shows that the Roman legionnaires 
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understood the physical, as well as the psychological space of military 
operations.  However, when the conquered peoples felt that the cost that they 
had to pay to the empire was more than the benefit they received from its 
protection, the empire began to dissolve.  However, there are inherent dangers in 
the military becoming the major foreign policy arm of a government and in 
government bureaucracies becoming so large and entrenched that they lose 
sight of their own purpose.  These dangers can lead to a deterioration of power 
not from an outside enemy, but rather from interior decay.  ―For the Romans, as 
for [the United States today], the elusive goal of strategic statecraft was to 
provide security for the civilization without prejudicing the vitality of its economic 
base and without compromising the stability of an evolving political order.‖55   
7. Lessons of Ancient Military Innovation 
Thucydides‘ Melian Dialogue is illustrative of some of the lessons of 
military innovation in ancient times.  In the dialogue, the Athenians argue that 
military might justifies their actions, while the Melians argue that alliance 
formation can lead to greater security.  In the short-term, the Athenians are 
correct—they are able to crush and enslave any peoples who do not submit to 
their will.  In the long-term however, the Melians prove more correct, as the 
Athenian political culture—in which no one took responsibility for decisions, and 
disunity and selfishness reigned supreme—eventually leads to its downfall.56  
The great powers of ancient history reflect this paradox.  Some of the most 
militarily innovative civilizations established the most powerful empires, like the 
Assyrians and the Spartans.  However, the record of history is written by 
civilizations that possessed the social influence and strategic coherence to 
persist through time.  The ancient powers that successfully coupled military 
innovations with the administrative mechanisms to support them were successful 
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in extending their power.  Egypt, as the first ‗great power,‘ was able to couple soft 
power with hard power innovations—the chariot and the doctrinal and 
organizational innovations that maximized it use—to maintain power 
preeminence.  By contrast, the Mycenaeans, imitated the technological invention 
but failed in the organizational innovation to effectively employ it.  Egypt and 
Athens present cases where military innovation occurred to protect a vibrant 
society and allow its growth.  Assyria and Sparta viewed military power as an end 
to itself.  That Egypt and Athens are in the historical record as two of the cradles 
of modern civilization is a testimony to which approach proved persistent. 
Military innovation in ancient times did not occur in a vacuum; it shaped 
and was shaped by the society in which it occurred.  Ancient Egypt is a case 
where military innovation took place to protect an already vibrant civilization.  The 
Akkadians, Assyrians, and Persians begin to understand the value of an 
administrative system to support a professionalizing military force.  This concept 
expands in Greece as the city-states of Athens and Sparta apply the same 
technological innovations to different ends.  The Athenians place the military in 
the context of a larger political structure, while the Spartans view military might 
as power in itself.  In ancient Greece, the military adoption of the phalanx and the 
trireme directly contributed to the formation of democracy as a political organizing 
principle and had lasting impressions on world history.   
The history of military innovation in ancient times holds the seeds of 
trends that have continued throughout time.  The great powers that were able to 
create a cycle of innovation between the military, political, social and economic 
spheres were able to maintain power longer than those who failed to create this 
feedback.  Conversely, a military that innovates to a certain point and stops, will 
likely fail to protect its society when its enemies turn those diffused innovations 
against it—as occurred with the Ottomans in the nineteenth century.  In order for 
a military to maintain its state‘s power, it must innovate regularly, correctly, and in 
time to meet the innovation of its enemy.  States that are able to accomplish this 
only do so through a social, political, economic and military innovation loop that 
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furthers the state‘s power in both hard and soft realms.  The above themes 
persist throughout this study, even as the complexity and interconnectedness 
among great powers continues to grow.  "Yet the customs of this most base 
people have so prevailed that they are adopted in all the world, and the 
conquered have given their laws to the conquerors, (victi victoribus leges 
dederunt).‖57 
B.  MEDIEVAL TIMES – TECHNOLOGY, WARFARE, AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE  
As our understanding of the history of technology increases, it 
becomes clear that a new device merely opens a door; it does not 
compel one to enter.  The acceptance or rejection of an invention, 
or the extent to which its implications are realized if it is accepted, 
depends quite as much upon the condition of a society, and upon 
the imagination of its leaders, as upon the nature of the 
technological item itself.58   
Military history transitions from ancient to medieval times with the battle of 
Adrianople (A.D. 378).59  In this battle, many believe that the Germanic horse 
decisively defeated the Roman legionaries, but it is more likely that the Gothic 
horsemen defeated the Romans using a surprise attack that capitalized on 
Roman lack of discipline.60  The employment of technological inventions with 
doctrinal and organizational innovation in this battle suggested that the trends 
from ancient times would persist, but also suggested a new military innovation 
emerging—the planned psychological utility of militaries.  This period lasts until 
the breakup of the Mongol Empire and the fall of the Byzantine Empire in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, respectively.  Although the Medieval Age is the 
last pre-modern era, its lessons are still valuable for modern great powers today. 
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1.  China—Han Dynasty (206 BC) to the Ming Dynasty (AD 1600s) 
Just as little in history overall fits into neat categories, so is it true of the 
military history of the Chinese empires.  Although the military innovations of 
Chinese civilization trace back to the ancient period, the medieval era is the point 
at which it enters western politics and historical records.  Although the sources 
vary widely, two technological innovations are commonly attributed to the 
Chinese—the invention of the stirrup and gunpowder.  Interestingly, neither of 
these inventions developed their full military potential in Chinese or Mongol 
militaries, but were adapted to more potent use by militaries of the west—the 
stirrup reaching its zenith with the Franks (although they were renowned infantry 
fighters), and the adaption of gunpowder continuing through the present time.  
These were only a few of the technological innovations of the Chinese, whose 
empires and civilizations have shown some of the greatest permanence in 
history. 
Stirrups originated in the Jin Dynasty in the fourth century AD.61  The 
invention diffused across southern Asia and Europe taking on different designs 
as it went.  The Indian peoples, who rode without shoes, used a small loop that 
encompassed the big toe only while others used various cloth and metal loops 
and hooks either as a mounting platform or for some stability while riding.  
However, it was the Franks and Charles Martel who maximized the use of the 
stirrup.  Martel coupled the stirrup with a lance that sat at rest under the rider‘s 
arm, as opposed to previous uses of lances by horsemen—either the single-
handed or two-handed spear which only bore the force of the rider‘s shoulder 
and arm.  The stirrup allowed the rider to transfer the momentum of the horse 
and rider into a lance blow.  This dramatically changed the course of mounted 
combat and marked a historical shift in military history from the armored knight to 
the advent of mounted shock combat.62  From the Franks, the innovation of 
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matching stirrup with lance to form a mounted shock force diffused throughout 
Europe.  The Normans defeated the Anglo-Saxons at Hastings because the latter 
were fighting with military technology two centuries old and lacked the doctrinal 
advantage of mounted shock.  Where the mounted shock doctrine spread, 
feudalism spread with it.  The stirrup is an example of a technological invention 
that not only shaped the militaries of the world at that time, but also forever 
affected the societies in which these militaries existed.63 That the inventor of this 
history-changing technology did not realize its military potential is also evident in 
the advent of gunpowder, discussed later. 
The early Chinese empires developed three military technologies that did 
contribute to the persistence of their power.  The Great Wall, a dramatic 
engineering feat for any point in history but especially for its era, protected the 
Chinese empires for centuries.  The Great Wall provided both a physical barrier 
against attack, but also had a psychological effect by reflecting the advanced 
abilities of the civilization it protected.  In a more technical vein, the early Chinese 
also developed the crossbow.  The crossbow shot an arrow with such force that it 
could knock an armored rider off a horse at 100 meters.  This invention, and its 
relative lack of diffusion throughout Asia and Europe, may illuminate why the 
Chinese did not pursue the military innovation of the stirrup that led later 
Europeans to centuries of fighting with armored cavalry—the Chinese had 
already invented the technology that negated the stirrup‘s effectiveness.64 
There is no record of China using the multi-oared triremes of the 
Mediterranean, but they developed multi-sailed ships earlier than their European 
counterparts did.65  By the fifth and sixth centuries, the Chinese developed 
paddlewheels for powering boats and by the eighth century, they had adapted 
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the paddlewheel to naval use and armored naval vessels.66  Early innovation of 
the paddlewheel boat showed both its promise and its limitations for sea power.  
Chinese technological innovators realized the advantages of self-propulsion and 
placed multiple paddlewheels on naval vessels.  In the twelfth century the 
Chinese navy fielded a boat with twenty-three separate paddlewheels and 
maintained the naval paddlewheel technology even after the Europeans had 
discarded it (only to use it again later).67  This technological innovation proved 
decisive in the Battle of Caishi in 1161.  Social and economic innovation diffused 
to and facilitated military innovation as the early Chinese began developing naval 
power.  This innovative cycle and resultant naval power, in the Ninth through 
Twelfth Centuries, would allow China to become the most productive trade zone 
in the world.68  As with many successful military innovations, this naval power, 
and the trade it protected, facilitated further innovation in both military and civilian 
sectors.  The Chinese leadership appreciated the prosperity provided by the 
naval power and this prosperity resourced further naval innovation.  From this 
feedback loop, the Chinese were able to develop a ―sea-going navy [that] was 
assuredly the greatest in the world between 1100 and 1450.‖69  
Gunpowder, much as the stirrup, originated in China, but found decisive 
military applications elsewhere.  Historians differ on interpretation, but common 
understanding is that the Chinese first developed the mixture of carbon, sulfur 
and saltpeter.  Early historical works seem to suggest that the Chinese only 
utilized this mixture in festivities, as fireworks.70  Regardless, whether the 
Chinese were inventors or merely advancers of the technology of gunpowder, 
they contributed to the dramatic military effect that it had on history.  The 
Mongols were among the first to employ gunpowder in battle during the late 
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thirteenth century.71  Therefore, the Chinese either invented or significantly 
advanced the use of gunpowder; the single powdery mix that continues to shape 
warfare to this day. 
Although Chinese technological innovations were numerous and had 
profound impact, they did not solely account for the persistence of their 
civilization or the longevity of their empires.  Certainly, geography had much to 
do with both, but advances in tactics, strategies and military-political applications 
of force also contributed.  The Chinese, in addition to building the Great Wall, 
pioneered a scorched earth tactic against invaders.  For protection of their 
populations, the Chinese built huge fortifications and moved all livelihood and 
methods of sustainment into the fortification.  They would then burn everything 
outside of the fortification so an invading army had no resources to sustain a 
siege.72  The Chinese also pioneered the first concept of civilian control of the 
military due to this scorched earth tactic.  After establishing a fortified defense, 
the Chinese realized the value of having a standing army ready to deploy and 
meet invaders.  The early Chinese military forces began a parallel version of 
professionalization, in this regard.  The militaries stayed in garrisons to protect 
the civilian population against invading hordes and the civilian population 
provided provisions to them.  The civilian population, and its leaders, ultimately 
held the power in this relationship as they maintained control of the resources.  
The civilian leadership, therefore, determined when to deploy the military in order 
to protect its citizens and its agricultural resources.73   
Civilian control of the military proved as successful at maintaining great 
power status for the Chinese as it had for the early Romans, and later would for 
the Byzantines.  As occurred in the Byzantine Empire, this civilian control of the 
military provided the political power of diplomacy and alliance formation.  For any 
power in the international system to employ coercive diplomacy or psychological 
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operations, it must demonstrate an ability to use physical force effectively.74  
Early Chinese rulers demonstrated an understanding of this principle, by not only 
continually innovating their militaries, but also by maximizing the effectiveness of 
this innovation through skillful coercive diplomacy.  The diplomatic leverage 
provided by such innovations as the Great Wall, scorched earth tactics, and 
civilian control of the military, proved successful in defending the Jin and Han 
dynasties against the Xiongnu to their north.  Through demonstrated capability 
and skilled alliance formation, Chinese leaders subjugated and then fractured the 
tenuous Xiongnu confederation in order to reduce their threat.  In this way, 
Chinese leaders using deterrent power and psychological warfare had truly 
reached the acme of Sun Tzu‘s prescriptions—they won a war with the Xiongnu 
without having to fight it. 
Although technological, organizational and doctrinal examples of 
innovation are evident and were supportive of the Chinese empires‘ longevity, 
social-political factors affecting the military may have been as pertinent.  The 
various emperors in Chinese history praised innovation and invention.  Often, the 
emperor himself rewarded the inventor of a new technology.  This emphasis on 
innovation served to spawn even more innovation.75  One may argue that it was 
not only the innovations themselves, but also the climate that fostered innovation, 
which helped protect the most consistently homogenous civilization and the most 
frequent great power in history.   Even compared to the innovative Mongols—
who used Islamic engineers to develop superior trebuchets and eventually 
adopted siege techniques superior to any contemporary—did the Chinese culture 
persist.  It was the allure of the Chinese civilization and permanence of their 
homogeneity that proved decisive.  When the Mongols conquered China, they 
had to maintain a separation between their culture and that of the Chinese, for 
                                            
74 Alvin H. Bernstein, ―Political Strategies for Coercive Diplomacy and Limited War‖ in 
Political Warfare and Psychological Operations:  Rethinking the US Approach ed. by Frank 
Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington, DC:  National Defense University Press, 1988), 145–153, 
passim. 
75 McNeill, Pursuit of Power, 39. 
 34 
fear of the pull of the latter.  In order to maintain this separation, Mongol 
conquerors maintained separate Chinese administrations under the Mongol 
rulers.  These administrations were ready-made revolutionaries to throw out the 
conquerors and ensure the persistence of the Chinese civilization.  This 
phenomenon explains the establishment of the Ming Dynasty at the end of the 
medieval period.76     
The longevity of power maintenance in early Chinese empires is a 
testimony to their innovation and soft power.  Civilian leaders created a social 
and political climate that rewarded invention and spawned innovation.  They also 
subjugated military leadership to civilian control without stifling innovation in the 
former.  In this way, early Chinese leaders not only facilitated the feedback loop 
between political, social, economic and military innovation, but also maximized 
the capacity of the resultant military innovation.  That this extraordinary level of 
innovation takes place in a relatively isolated civilization—absent of the constant 
threat that sometimes drives innovation—makes it even more remarkable.  
Chinese leaders utilized demonstrated capability to employ coercive diplomacy 
and psychological operations against their enemies, such as the Xiongnu.  
However, political-military integration only accounts for part of Chinese power 
longevity.  Soft power, in the form of an alluring and influential civilization fed by 
the same innovative loop described above, also played a major role in power 
maintenance.  China through the ancient and medieval period may provide the 
best example of power maintenance through resilience.  A culture and civilization 
that appealed to others to such a degree that enemies maintained separate 
administrations just to prevent being ‗tainted‘ by it, was the product of, and 
allowed innovation in political, social, economic and military areas.  This 
innovation, especially in the military, provided the hard power to defend the 
civilization.  When hard power failed, as with the Mongols, the soft power 
persisted and the resilience of the population regained its great power status. 
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 2.  The Byzantine Empire (330–1453) 
The dissolution of the Roman Empire was survived by the Byzantines for a 
thousand years.  Byzantine society viewed itself as the true inheritor of the 
greatness of Rome and as the Christian bulwark against barbarian invaders from 
the south.  As such, the empire also inherited many of the military traditions and 
administrative structures of the earlier Roman Empire.77  The Christian ethic that 
defined Byzantine society tended towards a pacifistic ideal, but the political will to 
protect the empire allowed for a competent military that was able to maintain the 
empire‘s power for over 1100 years. 
The success in power maintenance and longevity of the Byzantine Empire 
result from the continued Roman traditions of order, discipline and coherence in 
battle maneuvers.  The Byzantines continued the technological innovation of the 
stirrup with the use of knights.  The Byzantines applied this concept in the form of 
armored cavalry tactics conducted by knights.  These knights had limited reach 
and power, however, and trained for close-in fighting.78  The Roman use of the 
knight was a footnote in the western empire‘s organization, but in the Byzantine 
Empire armored knights proved especially effective in protecting frontier lands 
against steppe invaders.  However, not until the Franks coupled the knight with 
the stirrup did the concept of mounted shock combat become fully effective.  
What was truly innovative in the Byzantine military, however, was the concept of 
written doctrine.  Both military and civilian scholars began to capture not only 
stories of military success, but also tactics and lessons from the successes.  This 
written military tradition codified doctrine and provided the basis for further 
training and military discipline.79  The Muslims had this same tradition—of writing 
military histories and lessons—but the Byzantines succeeded by coupling this 
doctrine with a central administrative system that determined the allocation of 
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resources (both military expenditures and the commitment to force) for the 
betterment of the empire.  This doctrinal innovation provided a unified, 
standardized force that translated to coherent diplomatic relations.  Deterrence 
also became a key aspect of Byzantine strategy.  Punitive expeditions by 
Constantine V in Bulgaria and raiding by commanders on the eastern frontier 
were two examples of Byzantine rulers using military force to deter an opponent 
and thereby, prevent the need for the use of force in the future.80  Belisarius was 
a major doctrinal innovator in the Byzantine Army.  This innovative commander 
took risks in maneuvers that his contemporaries considered excessive in order to 
avoid confronting an enemy directly.  Belisarius considered flanking and rear-
attack maneuvers to be force multipliers and often won battles with smaller 
forces because of it.  In a classic example of his doctrinal innovativeness, 
Belisarius captured the fortified city of Naples without attacking its stout walls.  
Instead, he sent a force of four hundred men through the aqueduct system in the 
middle of the night to begin the attack from within the walls.  This maneuver was 
an operational risk as the four hundred men represented a large percentage of 
his force, and could easily have been killed in the narrow confines of the 
aqueduct tunnel.81 
Not until the advent of stealth technology, would the secret of a 
technological innovation be guarded again as carefully as that of Greek Fire.  
Greek Fire is the still-unknown mixture of chemicals that was shot through a 
piston to create a burning mass—akin to today‘s napalm.  Byzantine rulers, such 
as Constantine VII, protected this innovation from diffusion by threatening 
anyone in his government or military who was caught selling its secret.82  
Although Greek fire proved to be a potent weapon in protecting Byzantine 
fortified cities against attacking forces, enemies of the Byzantines quickly 
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developed countermeasures against it and the Byzantine military did not develop 
doctrine to maximize its effectiveness in an offensive manner on land.83  At sea, 
however, Greek Fire was decisive as both an offensive weapon and a 
psychological one.  It continued the innovative cycle begun by the Carthaginians 
in the Punic Wars, when the latter used small boats to try to set fire to the hulls of 
the Roman ships.  The value of Greek Fire was its ability to burn on top of the 
water, as well as stick to wet wooden ships. However, the siphons required to fire 
it at another ship required close range and calm waters, which did limit its utility 
on the high seas. Despite it being a close-guarded secret, the Arabs did 
eventually acquire the ability to make Greek Fire, and used it in their conquest of 
Crete in 824.84  Not only its requirement for close range and calm seas, but also 
the advent of gunpowder contributed to Greek Fire‘s short life span.  The 
Mongols and others realized the power of gunpowder to project missiles and 
rockets—a power that Greek Fire did not produce—and adopted the former 
rather than the latter.  In the organizational arena, the Byzantines were even 
more successfully innovative.  They created an early warning and raiding 
network of light infantry soldiers in the Taurus-Anti-Taurus Mountains.  This 
network was able to warn larger Byzantine military formations of the approach of 
enemy militaries.  This would allow the Byzantine forces to stay in reserve, move 
to the area most advantageous for battle, and meet the unsuspecting enemy at 
the time most opportune for the Byzantines.  This organizational innovation 
maximized the value of the Taurus-Anti-Taurus Mountains as a natural barrier to 
invasion.85 
The fall of the Byzantine Empire is, like most stories in geopolitical history, 
not the result of one factor, but of the confluence of numerous factors at a point 
in time.  The international system, especially to the north of Byzantium, changed 
with the emergence of powerful new rivals.  In addition, the loss of the natural 
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barrier to the southeast, the Taurus-Anti-Taurus mountain range, to the Turks 
made the empire vulnerable.  Finally, the very factor that had protected 
Byzantium for so long—its centralized administration system, which allocated 
resources for the protection of the empire—began to crumble from within.  A 
politically astute class of citizens began to question the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the centrally controlled system.  This new ―middle-class‖ then began 
to withhold the resources that they were supposed to pay to the central 
government, because of their lack of confidence in it.  The loss of these 
resources from the provinces caused a weakening of the military that relied upon 
them.  The weakened military caused a loss of the deterrent effect that it had 
established and the diplomatic coherence, which had resulted from it.  
Eventually, this cascade led to the dissolution of the entire empire.86 
The durability of the Byzantine Empire throughout the medieval period 
holds many lessons for today‘s great powers.  New research suggests that 
Byzantium was not as homogenously pacifist as previously thought.87  As with 
most things, the story is more complex.  The Christian ethic did imbue the society 
with a belief that warfare was inherently evil.  However, the historical record 
proves that Byzantines understood military power and warfare to be unavoidable 
in the protection of the empire.  This reluctance to fight, coupled with a doctrinally 
based military system, supported by a centrally controlled administrative entity, 
allowed for a diplomatic strategy such as had never been seen before.  A 
doctrine-based military supported diplomatic initiatives and provided Byzantine 
diplomats the proven capability to dissuade challengers and rising powers.  
Paradoxically, in this way the strong military supported the pacifist ethic by 
preventing conflict through deterrence.  However, the same system that 
supported the empire for almost 700 years was one of the factors in its downfall.  
When the cost of the inefficient central government and its military began to 
outweigh the value of the protection in the minds of those paying the costs, the 
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empire began to dissolve.  The lessons for the U.S. military are apparent:  
―Complex institutional arrangements, particularly [military and political], evolve 
certain well-worn methods for achieving certain ends, and it is usually only in 
times of major crisis and organizational upheaval that such methods can be 
substantially altered.‖88 
3. The Islamic Empire (632–1250) 
Muslim militaries showed little innovation in the realms of doctrine, 
organization, or technology.  Although sometimes cited as the motivation for the 
Frankish adoption of cavalry tactics, even this supposition is questionable.89  
Some of the literature on Muslim military innovation is scant because the Islamic 
tradition adopted by early rulers forbade artistic recreations of men and animals.  
These very sculptures and paintings from other civilizations, allow historians to 
trace the development and diffusion of technology through history.90  The 
absence of these artifacts from the early centuries of Islamic civilization may lead 
historians to undervalue the innovation of the Muslims.  However, one innovation 
provides both early military successes in the Muslim world and the permanence 
of Islamic culture—a charismatic leader with a compelling story. 
Mohammed was the sole innovator that allowed the establishment of both 
a Muslim Empire and a permanent world religion and culture.  ―Never before or 
since has a prophet won such success so quickly; nor has the work of a single 
man so rapidly and radically transformed the course of world history.‖91  The 
affect of Islam upon the expansion of the empire is hard to overstate.  The 
military successes of the original Muslim armies suggested to other Arabs that 
Allah was truly on the side of the Muslims.  This belief created more converts to 
Islam and consequently larger Muslim armies.  Mohammed‘s story and the larger 
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movement of Islamic expansion overpowered the internal rivalries among tribes 
and civilizations, such as the Iraqis and the Syrians.92  However, there were two 
key flaws inherent in the innovations of story and charisma, and the basis of an 
empire on them.  One was that when the charismatic leader died, as Mohammed 
did in 632, the movement must reevaluate its very character.  If the story that the 
leader used to rally his followers is not sufficient to carry on the cause, then the 
cause will fragment.  The death of Mohammed showed signs of this stress in the 
Islamic Empire.  The story of Islam was sufficient to incite the tribes to join, fight, 
and expand their empire, but was not enough to provide a stable system of 
governance to support this fight.  Mohammed was the link that held the story 
together.  With his death, his followers translated that story into political reality 
and everyday life—each according to his own interpretation.   
The Islamic Empires were not completely without innovation.  Fortunately, 
for the persistence of the religion and culture, a second great leader, Omar, was 
able to revive the empire and continue its expansion only two years after 
Mohammed‘s death.  He did this by adopting some the techniques of other 
powers at the time—such as instituting regular pay for soldiers and garrisoning 
them in fortresses under the control of the central government.  Even in the later 
Abbasid Empire, during the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Muslims controlled 
much of the Mediterranean through sea power.93  In fighting, the Muslims proved 
successful at what would later be termed swarming techniques, but these tactics 
were not really an innovation as there is little evidence of their intentional 
codification into doctrine as a marked improvement over other fighting formations 
of the time.  No real evidence exists of a single technological, doctrinal, or 
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Empires.  That they were able to maintain power for so long is a testimony to 
both charismatic leadership and the persistence of a compelling soft power story, 
such as religion.  
In Islam‘s translation from religious fervor able to incite men to fight into 
political reality and everyday life, fissures occur between its adherents.  The tribal 
rivalries suppressed by the success of the expanding empire resurfaced when 
the expansion culminates.  When the militaries of the empire are defeated in 
Europe by the Franks and in Constantinople by the Byzantines, this expansion 
stops.  The transition from the Islamic Empire, to the Ummayad Empire, based in 
Damascus, and finally the Abbasid Empire, based in Baghdad is indicative of this 
constant undercurrent of tribal rivalry.  The tribal rivalries never disappeared and, 
when combined with other social fissures such as the discrepancy between Arab 
Muslims and other converts, they undermined the power of the empire.94  These 
fissures effectively led to the downfall of the empire in a bloodless revolution to 
the Malmuk Turks.95  The Abbasid Empire, in order to help maintain order, 
created the Malmuk military as a provincial army.  The final signal of empire 
dissolution was the invasion of the Mongols and the overthrow of Baghdad that 
brought the Abbasid Empire to its official end.  Although the Islamic religion and 
culture would survive the breakup of the empire, the application of that religion to 
the governance of the empire would prove to be the point of contention that 
hastened its downfall.  The Islamic Empire is an example of the power and 
limitations of charismatic leadership and a compelling story.  The soft power 
component can persist through history, but must have a hard power complement 
to maintain an empire.  The inability of the Muslim militaries to innovate 
technologically, doctrinally, and organizationally led to the downfall of the empire.  
However, the compelling soft power persisted through time, even in the absence 
of an empire champion. 
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4.   The Mongol Empire (1206–1368) 
Emerging from the Central Asian steppes under the brilliant leadership of 
Genghis Khan, the Mongolian Empire spread faster than any empire in history 
and, at its peak, represented the largest contiguous empire in history.  The 
Mongols banded together as a tribal people that had threatened the Chinese 
empires for centuries—the latter building the Great Wall to defend against the 
former.  The leader that banded them together, Genghis Khan, would become, 
―the greatest conqueror in history.‖96  The expansion of the Mongol Empire was 
similar in some ways to the Islamic Empire.  Both expansions were predicated on 
a single charismatic leader and employed the inherent strengths of their fighters 
to conduct swarming tactics.  Also similar to the Islamic Empire, the Mongol 
Empire required expansion to maintain unity—when successive charismatic 
leaders (Genghis, his son Ogedei, and his grandson Kublai) died and expansion 
of the empire ceased, it dissolved into separate groups that fought over power 
and control.  However, the Mongol Empire differed sharply from the Islamic 
Empire in its level of innovativeness.   
In an early instance of civil-military integration, Genghis Khan instituted 
the Yasak—a code of laws to govern daily life.97  These laws, for the first time 
among independent, nomadic peoples, dictated a rigorous code for both civilians 
and military alike.  In the realm of military innovation, the Yasak mandated that 
any booty gained through conquest would be divided between the soldiers who 
took part in battle.  This served to engender neighboring tribes to join forces with 
Genghis Khan, as his laws were not only inclusive of all levels of social status, 
but also fairly and strictly enforced.  This set of laws, along with Genghis‘ 
inclusiveness of religions and support for trade made many neighboring 
civilizations choose to join the Mongol Empire rather than be conquered by it.  
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However, not all peoples were willing to join; the Mongols specifically clashed 
with the Jin Dynasty in the south and the Persians in the West. 
Genghis and his successors understood the value of information to 
warfare.  Not only did Genghis organizationally innovate his armies into units of 
multiples of ten (10, 100, 1000, and 10,000-man units) and establish imperial 
guards headed by his most loyal followers (as opposed to his family members), 
but also he established a General Staff and a spy network.  He had formal spies 
in the territory of each of the three enemies to the Mongol Empire:  the Kins, the 
Hsi-Hsia, and the Kara-Khitai.98  In addition, Genghis entertained traders coming 
from any bordering state in his personal residence, in order to gain as much 
information about his neighbors as possible.  He used the information from his 
spies and the traders he entertained to learn the strength and disposition of the 
Chinese militaries to his south and to prepare his forces for the eventuality of war 
with them.  This ability to employ information to support a well-organized and 
trained force, allowed for the rapid expansion of the Mongol Empire, which by the 
end of the thirteenth century stretched from China to Eastern Europe.  In the 
connection of these civilizations, the Mongols were able to further innovate with 
the imitation of technology from both ends of the empire and the innovation in 
military and political realms that allowed the Pax Mongolica.  An example of this 
imitation of invention into innovation is the Mongol use of gunpowder.  As 
discussed above, gunpowder is believed to have been invented for non-military 
means in China.  However, the Mongolian conquerors of China are among the 
first to use this invention at the Battle of Sajo in 1241 and on a large scale in the 
attempted invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281.99  They also adapted the 
concept of siege warfare to their operations, which was unique for a military 
based on nomadic warriors.  From the West, the Mongols adopted the trebuchets 
for use in sieges and innovated the use of combat engineers and rockets in 
sieges.  They used the skills of the artisans in conquered lands and often built 
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siege trains from the resources available in the area they were besieging.  As 
gunpowder and trebuchets attest, the vastness of the Mongol Empire was a  
resource itself—the innovativeness of Mongol military leaders allowed them to 
subsume inventions from all parts of their empire in order to maintain its military 
strength and power. 
The Mongol Empire rose and expanded under the innovative and 
charismatic leadership of Genghis Khan and his successors.  These leaders 
were able to translate their fighters‘ innate ability to ride and fight from horses 
into swarming doctrine that overwhelmed and destroyed their enemies.  Known 
as the Crow Swarm, or Falling Stars attack, this type of maneuver was controlled 
by drums or fire signals.  The Mongols would literally attack simultaneously from 
all directions, bloody their enemy and depart as quickly as they came.  This 
attack method had a completely disorienting effect on their enemies—the latter 
as confused by the onslaught as by the immediate silence that followed.100  Later 
they matched these skills with organizational innovations for fighting units and 
technological innovations in the use of gunpowder to further expand and maintain 
a vast empire.  They coupled this military prowess with a civil set of laws and 
administration of infrastructure that led neighboring civilizations to join rather than 
be conquered by the Mongols.  This power was undergirded by information in 
two ways—the Mongol rulers used spies and ‗open-source‘ trader information to 
learn about their enemies and they employed the psychological warfare of 
ruthless battlefield tactics and smoke screening to defeat and dissuade future 
attackers.  The Mongols were ‗ahead of their time‘ in many ways; from 
understanding the interconnectedness of economic and political power to 
accepting freedom of religion and open sharing of ideas.  In its decline, the 
Mongol Empire was also ahead of its time.  Predating the overstretch of the 
European powers by more than 500 years, the Mongols were unable to maintain 
a unified empire.  Partially, as a result of the ‗openness‘ that made the empire so 
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successful, the later successors of Genghis Khan were each drawn in the 
direction of the conquered lands—some adopting Islam as their personal religion, 
others becoming immersed in the Chinese culture.  When the succession of 
Khans fell apart and the heirs to the throne began fighting one another, the 
vastness of the empire proved susceptible to attack from without and dissolution 
from within. 
5.  Lessons From the Period of Social Change 
In ancient times, civilizations and their militaries were mostly isolated, and 
often innovation took place in a vacuum.  The trend during the ancient period 
was for a military to develop a technological innovation that surprised and 
overwhelmed its enemy.  However, these innovations did not provide permanent 
power, as an enemy was able to copy this technology and turn it on its inventor.  
Therefore, success was defined by the powers who could adapt organizationally 
and doctrinally to employ this technology better than its opponent could.  In the 
medieval era, the ecumene was expanding as civilizations came in contact with 
one another.  As interconnectedness grew, so did the complexity to which 
militaries innovated.  The medieval era saw the development of military 
subordination to civilian leadership and the power of psychological warfare.  
Civilian leaders were able to employ coercive diplomacy based on real military 
strength and military leaders were able to conduct operations with psychological 
effects—confident that word of their prowess will spread in an interconnected 
world and have its intended effect.  The Mongol Empire was one of the best 
examples of this use of psychological warfare in both battlefield tactics and in 
expansion of the empire.  This military capability required frequent innovation of 
technology, organization, and doctrine, best served by an innovative society.   
The soft power of culture and civilization undergirds the hard power of 
military might.  The civilization in this era that most aptly combines all the above 
elements is the Chinese.  A Chinese political structure that fostered an innovative 
spirit in its society and its military, while subordinating the capabilities of the latter 
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to the aims of the former, provides the best example of a resilient civilization that 
maintains great power, with only brief interruptions, from ancient times to the 
modern era.  The lessons for the United States are clear.  Soft power alone will 
not maintain great power status, as the Islamic Empire was unable to translate a 
compelling story and charismatic leadership into empire power maintenance.  For 
true power persistence, great powers must couple soft power components with 
hard power capabilities.  Innovation is a factor in both of these.  An innovative 
society creates a civilization and culture that others want to emulate.  It also 
spawns military innovation that protects this civilization and culture.  Through the 
combination of these two factors, a great power is resilient and able to maintain 
its power status in the face of uncertainty.  The next period of historical analysis, 
the First Period of Globalization, contains the first example of a true military 
revolution.  The roots of this revolution are in the medieval period.  As medieval 
innovation in technology, doctrine and organization built upon the lessons of 
ancient times, so will the modern era adapt the innovation of an earlier period. 
C. THE FIRST PERIOD OF GLOBALIZATION, 1492–1800:101  THE AGE 
OF SEAPOWER AND EUROPEAN EXPANSION 
The Medieval Era produced Europeans that were instilled with a warlike 
nature, naval mastery, and a resistance to disease.102  This combination would 
make the first period of globalization a period of European expansion.  This 
period is characterized by commercialization, an elevated status for the military, 
and power projection.  Countries that embodied these characteristics in military 
doctrine were able to expand and exert geopolitical influence.  Yet, this period 
also continues to underscore the importance of military adaptation and political 
integration of military and commercial interests.  That is, bureaucratic resistance 
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to innovation was often attributable to the decline of great powers.  The First 
Period of Globalization marks the historical transition in which great powers truly 
become global powers.  This period began in the late fifteenth century with a 
military reflective of society.  Officers were members of the societal nobility and 
the militaries were, ―…not forces ‗outside‘ society, but rather reflections of 
patterns of social control and influence and the beliefs that gave cohesion to 
these patterns.‖103  By the end of this period, militaries had truly undergone a 
revolution and were able to shape the social and political strata of the countries 
in which they served, rather than merely reflect it.104  In the period of three 
hundred years, a new type of revolutionary patriot replaced the ancien regime 
throughout most of the great powers in the ecumene.    
 A second trend in military innovation during this period is the 
commercialization of the military.  This term applies both to the realization by 
great powers of the period that a strong military was necessary to maintain the 
commercial interest of the power, and to the fact that powers began to hire 
mercenaries from other countries to protect their interests.105  This 
commercialization of the military establishment facilitated the first global empires.  
As powers acquired wealth, they developed military capabilities to protect and 
further this wealth.  Global reach was first made possible by navies who could 
project power to all corners of the ecumene.106  In addition, European military 
leaders realized the value of drilled forces and the doctrinal innovation of training 
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and drill professionalized militaries that could defeat powers possessing greater 
technological innovation.107  It is possible that Europe‘s rise to prominence during 
this age is as much a factor of geography—an arms race and innovation race 
that ensued due to the close proximity of multiple powers—as it was to the 
degree of innovative capacity over other regions of the world.  In the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, Europe was at war.  The people of the continent were 
undergoing the Reformation, which often placed the ongoing state struggles for 
power supremacy in a religious context.108  First, the widely dispersed and 
heterogeneous Hapsburg Empire made a bid for continental supremacy—only to 
be balanced against by French and Dutch land power and, above all, British 
seapower that blocked its attempts to expand.  Then it was France‘s turn to 
attempt dominance of Europe.  The pluralistic power of the continental countries 
allied to balance this threat as well. Only when Britain developed a 
complementary continental and sea power strategy that did not attempt 
domination of the lands of Europe, did a European great power realize global 
power status.   
 The early modern period presents the first example of a military 
revolution.109 This military revolution saw armored cavalry replaced by infantry as 
the primary weapon in battle, aided by the English longbow and the pike.  Later, 
the pike and shot combination, made possible by gunpowder, led to artillery and 
siege warfare.  Also the expansion to large armies was possible due to less 
relative skill needed to be an infantryman as compared to an armored 
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cavalryman.110  This period of continual conflict climaxed, and was epitomized, 
by the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), which included the doctrinal innovation of 
Gustavus Adolphus II of Sweden.  He pioneered the concept of massed artillery 
fire, blended with muskets and pikemen in combined arms integration, to help 
check the expansionist ambitions of the Hapsburgs.  The test lab provided by 
ongoing warfare in Europe in the early modern era allowed the prototyping of 
technological, doctrinal, and organizational innovations that proved beneficial to 
those powers able to capture and capitalize on its the lessons.111  This 
‗innovation under fire‘112 during the first half of this period of globalization may be 
the linchpin that allowed Europe to dominate the second half.  While Europe‘s 
test bed allowed innovation to take place rapidly and effectively, the far and near 
east were able to prosper and innovate due to their geography and relative 
security.  
1.  The Ottoman Empire (1453–1918) 
 The Ottoman Empire was established as a great power in 1453 when 
Mehmet II took Constantinople from the Byzantines.  The empire experienced a 
period of significant growth for the two centuries, reaching its apogee in 1683 
when it threatened to conquer Vienna, stagnating and slowly declining over the 
next 235 years, until its fall in 1918.  The Ottoman Turk slave soldiers early on 
embraced innovations of the west and present a stark contrast to the Mamluk 
army.  In 1517, the Ottomans overthrew the Mamluk army, the successors of the 
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Muslim Abbasid Empire.  The Mamluk knights used firearms in sieges, but 
refused to use them in battle.  The Ottomans, on the other hand, did not have a 
moral prohibition against the use of firearms, adapted this technology quickly and 
overthrew their Mamluk opponent.113  The Ottoman Empire rose out of an 
advanced civilization that was farther ahead of Europe in mathematics and 
science, including cartography and medicine.  The toleration of other ethnicities 
allowed Ottoman rulers to bring Greek, Jewish, and European scholars and 
technicians to work for the benefit of the empire.  The unified central governance 
system of the Ottomans, based on an official faith, culture and language allowed 
it to rule over an area larger than the Roman Empire.  As with the Byzantine 
Empire, this centrality of governance was essential for the Ottomans‘ rise to great 
power.  Great rulers, like Mehmet and Suleiman, were able to translate vast 
lands full of riches and people into power, while maximizing the centrality of their 
geographical location to control trade between Europe and Asia.  They created 
naval ships that expanded and protected the empire and massive armies that, at 
one time, threatened to conquer Europe. They also used the inclusiveness of 
Islam to recruit Christian youth from the Balkans who formed dedicated, 
uniformed janissary units.114   
 The Ottomans were quick to adapt and use the Europeans technological 
innovations of handguns, field guns, and siege guns, most of all.  However, the 
Ottomans were, ―expert imitators, but poor innovators.‖115  This inadequacy is 
evident in three areas:  the decision to build and use only large cannons; the 
failure to adapt doctrine and organization to technological innovations; and the 
inferiority of their metallurgy.  The Ottomans adopted the use of firearms from the 
Europeans without the moral constraints of the Mamluks.  This adoption, and the 
resultant doctrine based on large cannons, was validated by the destruction of 
Constantinople in 1453.  However, while Europeans innovated cannonry to make 
                                            
113 Parker, Military Revolution, 126. 
114 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 11. 
115 Parker, Military Revolution, 127. 
 51 
it smaller and more maneuverable, Ottoman armies continued to view the value 
of only large cannons, and their ability to deal a decisive blow.  Whether this 
doctrine was based on a cultural bias towards large cannons or the inability of 
the Ottomans to mass-produce smaller cannons, is of debate.116  What is 
apparent from the historical record is that the Ottomans could imitate technology, 
but their military leaders failed to adapt this technology into adequate doctrine.  
The early Ottoman militaries possessed a siege-train mechanism superior to any 
found in Europe.  However, by the siege of Vienna in 1683, the massive Ottoman 
armies failed to adopt the doctrinal lessons of European sieges—that an army in 
siege must also protect itself from armies coming to the aid of the besieged city.  
This doctrinal failure resulted in a dramatic loss for the Ottomans, and indicated 
that their period of expansion had ended.  The failure to adapt doctrine and 
continue to innovate also resulted in the once-superior Ottoman navy being 
routed at Lepanto in 1571.117 
 How did a superior military and navy power, with an advanced societal 
base and an enormous empire, lose power in such quick succession?  As with 
the Byzantine Empire, the strength of a centrally controlled system that allocated 
resources to expand the empire also became its greatest weakness.  A centrally 
controlled empire works well with competent, adaptable leaders at its helm.  
Unfortunately, for the Ottomans, they experienced a string of thirteen 
incompetent sultans beginning in 1566.118  These leaders caused such a rapid 
decline of the empire precisely because of its rigid bureaucratic structure.  That 
this succession of poor leaders coincided with an internal split in the empire only 
hastened its demise.  The Shi‘ite adherents of Islam began to feud with the Sunni 
majority in the Ottoman Empire.  The central leadership responded to this dissent 
by restricting free expression of thought and free institutions.  The military 
became a bastion of this controlling conservatism and pursued the government‘s 
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desire to check innovation.  As a conservative culture pervaded not only the 
central government but also the military, innovation stopped.  Without this military 
innovation, and with armies spread over an enormous landmass, the Ottoman 
Empire began to feel the strain of imperial overreach.  The decline of the empire, 
therefore, began with an internal crumbling of the system, later accelerated by 
the attacks of some European powers, which had continued to innovate in the 
pursuit of global power, and alternately viewed the Ottoman Empire as a threat. 
2.   The Hapsburg Empire (1648–1918) 
The Ottomans‘ direct neighbor to the north, and its greatest enemy, was 
the Hapsburg Empire.  At its height, the Hapsburg family ruled, by conquest and 
by marriage, over the area of Eastern and Northern Europe, Northern Italy, 
Germany and Spain.  Although the Hapsburg monarchy technically ruled into the 
twentieth century, the empire devolved into the major powers of Spain, the 
United Provinces of the Netherlands, and Austria-Hungary during its 500-year 
history.  The story of the rise and establishment of this vast empire is a unique 
one, having to do as much with inherited land through marital relationships as 
with military conquests.  Nonetheless, the empire was supplied by vast fertile 
lands and a large population that were able to sustain its power, despite its 
inability to express a unifying grand strategy.  When Charles V assumed the 
throne of Holy Roman Emperor in 1519, he inherited the territory that bounded 
France on both sides.  This geographical factor would pit France against the 
Hapsburg Empire for the next two centuries.  Juxtaposed on this state conflict 
was the European social upheaval caused by the Reformation.  Where religious 
differences were involved, as between the Catholic Hapsburgs and the 
Protestant Germans, rulers were more likely to fight than to seek a 
compromise.119  The stage in Europe was set for a long period of warfare, which 
culminated in the Thirty Years War. 
                                            
119 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 33. 
 53 
It is debated whether the Hapsburg rulers sought European domination, or 
just defense of the empire.120  At its zenith, the Hapsburg Empire encompassed 
one quarter of the population of Europe; more importantly, it contained the 
largest ports in Europe.  Due to the large territory that the empire encompassed, 
if it had only been able to defend its borders against French expansion and 
Ottoman incursions, it would have de facto dominated Europe.  However, the 
French and Ottomans actually combined forces to balance against the 
Hapsburgs, and the French consistently supported German princes against their 
enemy.121  By 1556, Charles V abdicated his throne as Holy Roman Emperor to 
his brother and his position as king of Spain to his son.  With this split, it became 
clear that ―like the double-headed black eagle in the imperial coat of arms, the 
Hapsburgs had two heads at Vienna and at Madrid, looking east and west.‖122  
That three major powers spawned out of the Hapsburg Empire—Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Austria-Hungary—gives one an appreciation for its size and 
wealth.  However, this size would prove a weakness to the empire, as well, as 
the real costs of warfare dramatically increased during this age of paid 
professional forces and mercenary units.  As the balancing forces of European 
powers that feared domination of one power—or religion—and the constant 
threat of the Ottomans to the south put constant pressure on the empire, the 
costs of its defenses outgrew the revenues of its resources.  Prior to the 
Hapsburg Empire becoming a great power, the Dutch revolt had already started 
to separate the Empire‘s disparate parts. 
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The Spanish Netherlands, as with the Italy, were unattached appendages 
to the Hapsburg Empire.123  In the throes of the Reformation, the provinces of the 
Netherlands began to fight one another and their Spanish rulers in the mid-
sixteenth century.  Protestants provinces fought against Catholic ones, and 
against their Catholic monarch in Spain, constituting the Eighty Years War.  
Occasionally aided by Protestant England in their pursuit of independence, Philip 
IV of Spain recognized the United Provinces of Netherlands as independent at 
the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648.  The last fifteen years of the Thirty 
Years War, the United Provinces were only indirectly involved in the conflict.  
This relatively slight involvement, and preoccupation of the other major powers 
on the continent in total war, allowed the Dutch to look outward.  They developed 
a maritime and trade empire in North America and Africa before even receiving 
their independence.  After independence, this empire extended around the world, 
with colonies as far away as Indonesia and South America.  The confederate of 
provinces also created the first capitalist economic system, with a stock market 
and boom and bust market cycles.  This system spawned the Dutch East and 
West India companies—the acumen of an era of commercialization of national 
strategy and an expansionist capitalist government.  Militarily, Dutch sea power 
was ensured by merchant marines, with no dedicated or standing naval forces.  
Even in a later arms race with England, discussed below, the Dutch built dual-
purpose ships that would arm the merchants on board for their own protection, 
but did not build warships or professionalize sailors to support a grand strategy to 
protect the empire.  Consequently, the Netherlands never built adequate 
defenses to protect its borders or its sovereignty.  With the rise of Napoleon 
Bonaparte, the Netherlands would quickly become a province of the new French 
Empire, and never reach true great power status—despite its global reach.  The 
Dutch example is one that teaches the limits of capitalism and commercialization.  
The privatization of empire expansion is adequate to spread a country‘s interests 
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to the corners of the globe.  However, if the profits from this empire are not 
reinvested in adequate defenses, which protect its interests, the country will 
never have truly great power—only great wealth.  
The story of Hapsburg Spain embodies much of the military revolution and 
provides a harbinger for other great powers.  Like its Dutch counterpart, the 
Spanish geographical location lent itself to maritime expansion.  In accordance 
with the common practice at the time, Charles V used dual-purpose galleons and 
galleys to spread his merchant empire and protect themselves.  His son, Philip II, 
was not able to maintain this practice in the late 1500s.  Due to the threat of 
Barbary Pirates in the Mediterranean and the English Royal Navy in the Atlantic, 
Philip II had the state build galleys to protect continued exploration.124  In the 
short term, this political integration of commercialization and the military was 
sustainable, the wealth from the Americas and other colonies paid for the 
Spanish military operations.  However, combined with the factors listed below, 
the expense of supplying ships to further the state‘s interest proved unbearable.  
The empire‘s Spanish component, and its Portuguese neighbors, made the first 
expeditions across the Atlantic and around the world.  However, the Spanish and 
Portuguese explorations were insufficient to make their respective countries 
secure global powers.  Instead, they were directly threatened by English 
privateers and Barbary Corsairs, and indirectly undermined by the inability of 
their governments to translate this superior seafaring capability into real power.   
The social structure of Castile made soldiering a popular and fashionable 
occupation for gentry and commoners alike.  Gonzolo de Córdoba combined this 
rich social foundation with innovative military organizations and doctrine to make 
a Spanish infantry second to none.  From the early sixteenth century until 
midway through the Thirty Years War, ―the Spanish tercio was the most effective 
unit on the battlefields of Europe.‖125  Castilian soldiers combined pikeman, 
swordsmen and arquebusiers in infantry regiments to sweep the armies of other 
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countries before them.126  This superior Castillian infantry not only dominated 
French cavalry and Swiss pike phalanxes, but removed the former from the 
Italian city-states of Naples and Milan and allowed the technological innovation of 
the trace italienne.  The technological innovation of trace italienne checked the 
gunpowder revolution in Europe, which had, up until this time, determined 
success or failure in battle.  These fortifications were built in Northern Italy by the 
Hapsburg Spanish and altered the offensive balance that was afforded by 
improved cannonry.  The lack of dead space created by these innovative 
fortresses, and their ability to withstand the cannonry of the day, had far-reaching 
implications for warfare in Europe.  Not only was there a resurgence in favor of 
defensive strategy, but also armies were built to sizes that had never been 
imagined previously—because siege warfare was extremely manpower 
intensive.127  
As with previous innovations in history, the trace italienne, created by the 
Spanish Hapsburgs, may also have led to the downfall of its creator.  As the 
innovation spread throughout Europe in the late sixteenth century, the sizes of 
armies required to maintain power grew exponentially.  While the Spanish 
infantry were once considered the premier fighting force on the continent, their 
numbers were not great enough to keep pace with this size explosion.  
Consequently, by the mid seventeenth century, Hapsburg Spanish rulers began 
hiring mercenaries from Germany, Italy and Ireland.128  These mercenaries were 
not only inferior to the Spanish tercios they were also more expensive.  Because 
Spain, like the Netherlands, was a market-based economy, the king had to 
borrow money to support the military from lenders.  Unlike in autocratic 
governments, the Spanish king was responsible to repay the debts to finance 
war.  This is not to suggest that Charles V, and later Philip II, were irresponsible 
spenders.  Instead, they were caught in a Catch-22, where the military demands 
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of the age—massive increases in the size of armies and their costs, expensive 
construction of trace italienne fortifications and a requirement to protect merchant 
shipping from both royal navies and Barbary Pirates—outpaced the ability to 
acquire funds.  Philip II, in particular, believed that future military conquests 
would secure the riches necessary to get the country out of debt.129  This did not 
prove to be the case.  Spain continuously defaulted on its loans and declared 
bankruptcy.  The lesson from the Spanish decline is that no matter how good a 
country‘s military is in the field or at sea, if the expenditures of the country are 
greater than the revenue provided, that country will eventually decline in power. 
Although the Hapsburg Empire proved unable to maintain its 
‗appendages,‘ the heart of the empire, Vienna, and the area that would later be 
known as the Austrian Empire persisted.  The Hapsburg Empire presents a clear 
example of the first great European power.  Unique in its formation, geography 
doomed this empire to fight too many wars, spend too much money and 
consolidate too many heterogeneous cultures to persist.  With its power 
constantly checked by an alliance of balancing forces throughout the two 
centuries, this empire felt—possibly more than any other sovereignty at the 
time—the effects of the Reformation and the continual European struggle for 
continental dominance.  Under these pressures, it failed to consolidate and 
spread its power as later European powers would be able to do.  The different 
strategies pursued by its three largest components—the United Provinces, Spain 
and Austria—tore the empire apart, but led to relative success for each of the 
parts. 
3.   France (1648–1789) 
 France emerged from the Thirty Years‘ War as the European hegemon.  It 
achieved this feat by reinstating a monarchy to control the state, but allowing the 
flexibility for older cultural institutions to fade away rather than be abolished.  
Although the official state religion was Catholicism, Henry IV kept state interests 
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distinct from those of the Church.  Under Louis XIII, Richelieu, chief minister of 
the king and a cardinal of the Church, used the king‘s armies to consolidate 
power and establish the French style of absolute monarchy.  This model was 
followed by the other European powers of the time.130  The concept that allowed 
this monarchy to remain stable was a large bureaucratic administration 
composed of the middle class.  This administration supported the monarchy and 
appeased the classes that had previously been under nobility rule.  France‘s 
power was also supported by a rich resource base and a large population, which 
allowed a certain amount of self-sufficiency.  Upon entering the Thirty Years War, 
French forces and generals were inferior to those of Spain and Germany, but 
through experience in battle, the military dramatically improved.  When the 
French military skill matched those of its opponents, France‘s power overtook 
that of its neighbors by virtue of a broader resource and manpower base from 
which to support an Army.  Following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the 
conclusion of war with Spain in 1659, Louis XIV, who had come of age in the 
time of civil disorder, saw fit to maintain a large standing army—foremost to 
maintain order within the state, and secondly to project power outward.131  The 
large population and resource base allowed Louis XIV, in the later part of the 
seventeenth century to dramatically expand the French armies to meet the 
expansionist aims of the state.132   
 With focus on maintaining a hegemonic status and a premier military from 
Louis XIV, the French military modernized and professionalized its force.  This 
innovation may have been more imitative of earlier Italian inventions, but 
nonetheless, produced a French army second to none.133  Standardization 
occurred in both organizational and tactical arenas.  Soldiers were regularly paid 
with money from tax revenues and civilian administrations controlled supply of 
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equipment.  Doctrinally, infantry, cavalry and artillery units were distinguished, 
but coordinated as never before in combined arms fighting—first pioneered a 
millennium earlier by the Assyrians.  Drill was the other doctrinal and 
organizational change that helped the French Army maintain the country‘s 
hegemonic status.  First pioneered by the Romans, later adopted by Maurice of 
Nassau of Holland—the key European who popularized drill—the art was 
perfected by Lieutenant Colonel Martinet of the French army.  Martinet, whose 
name was to become synonymous with detailed drill and standardization, infused 
the French army with a concept that every free moment should be spent in drill.  
The discipline and standardization that this first concept of ‗garrison training‘ 
instilled, allowed the French army to keep soldiers occupied during times when 
they may otherwise have been causing problems and to instill an esprit de corps 
that helped socialize the fighting unit.  Coupled with longer enlistments that 
resulted from a standing army, and the French structural innovations had 
numerous positive consequences on the vitality of their military.134 
 In the first power transition, France‘s decline was a culmination of factors.  
The dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire was affected by balancing forces of 
other European powers—led by France.  With the power of the Hapsburgs gone, 
France became the primary power in Europe.  In a European environment of 
pluralistic power, focus then switched from balancing against the Hapsburgs to 
balancing against France.  In his goal to expand his landholdings and weaken his 
neighbors, Louis XIV attacked to the north, east and south.  France, instead of 
accounting for the balancing dynamic on the continent and developing a strategy 
against it, continued to pursue expansion under Louis XIV.  Lacking a clear grand 
strategy to effect expansion, the government that had once standardized and 
professionalized its force, now divided emphasis between its land and maritime 
forces.   
 As a major land power, France‘s maritime component should have been 
built to support and strengthen its army.  Ironically, the same military that had 
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distinguished ground forces into separate maneuver units and innovated the 
doctrine to standardize their fighting, failed to integrate its ground and maritime 
components.  While ground forces attacked neighbors in every direction, the 
French navy focused outwardly.  A sizable navy built under the direction of Louis 
XIV‘s finance minister, Jean Baptiste Colbert, coupled galleons and merchant 
ships.  These naval forces sought to build colonies throughout the world—
including entering the Indian Ocean in 1666.  Colbert innovated with the French 
navy doctrinally in the establishment of France‘s maritime code, the Ordonnance 
de la Marine—which became the model for other European powers.  He also 
conducted organizational innovation by establishing naval academies and bases 
throughout France.135  But the French Navy remained doctrinally focused on 
attacking the superior British Royal Navy, instead of supporting the army 
campaigns.  In this endeavor, the French were defeated time and again by the 
superior British sea forces.  These defeats, coupled with the rising costs of 
maintaining a direct battle fleet, caused the French navy to resort to commerce 
raiding—what they called the guerre de course—as their driving doctrinal 
concept.136  This decision determined that France would never be a major 
seapower, and consequently would lose power over the coming centuries as 
seapower became paramount.  In contrast to Britain‘s integrated land and 
maritime strategy, France did not create a coherent grand strategy to maximize 
the effectiveness of its professional and standardized forces.137  This strategic 
overstretch, lack of grand strategy, and balancing of other states against it led to 
France‘s decline into Revolution. 
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4.  Britain (1648–1800) 
Sir Walter Raleigh, quoting both Francis Bacon and Themistocles, stated, 
―Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the 
trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world 
itself.‖138  Britain‘s story of the rise to global world power begins with a 
Portuguese named Prince Henry the Navigator.  In the late fifteenth century, the 
Portuguese invented technological improvements in navigation that made sea 
faring expeditions possible.139  However, the story of British global power is not 
only one of sea power; Britain dislodged France from the world power position 
with a complementary maritime and continental strategy.  The reciprocating 
‗virtuous triangle‘ of trade, colonies and navy was a necessary, but not sufficient 
component that brought Britain to global power and maintained its status 
there.140 
In the beginning of the sixteenth century, only England and Portugal 
possessed a standing navy.  However, the Dutch maintained control of the seas 
with a vast merchant-marine fleet, an expanded commercial empire, and a virtual 
monopoly on maritime trade.  European powers, like the Dutch, tended to lease 
or confiscate merchant ships in times of war to build a fleet, or build ships for 
naval purposes, but lease them to merchants in times of peace.  Countries also 
used privateers extensively to conduct their business on the high seas and in 
newly discovered lands.141  England used these merchants and privateers, along 
with its limited navy, to establish colonies in North America, the West Indies and 
India.  Despite relatively limited involvement in the Thirty Years War, England 
had significant internal revolts and disputes during the same period.  As a result 
of these internal crises, many English settlements abroad were left to fend for 
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themselves and created organic government in the absence of a colonial one.142  
Francis Bacon brought the concept of sea power to England with his 1625 article, 
―Of the true greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,‖143 but Oliver Cromwell set its 
course for history. 
Following the Thirty Years‘ War, and continuing civil strife in England, 
British merchants looked to expand trade and sea power.  France, in its ill-fated 
attempt at both land and maritime hegemony, began an undeclared maritime war 
on the English Navy followed by a declared continental war.  At the same time, 
the Dutch continued to expand and monopolize their hold on maritime trade.  In 
October 1651, Cromwell pursued and the English Parliament passed the 
Navigation Act—directly aimed at Dutch trade supremacy.  It forbade goods from 
entering English ports, except in English boats or in the boats of their country of 
origin.  Because the Dutch did not produce goods for export, but rather 
monopolized the movement of those goods, this legislation set the course for the 
Anglo-Dutch Wars.144  Cromwell quickly innovated the organization of his navy to 
meet the demands of this new grand strategy.  The naval administration was 
overhauled, several army colonels were designated ‗Generals at Sea,‘ and 
English shipyards doubled the fleet‘s strength in two years.145  This rapid change 
was possible due to the political integration between Cromwell and the navy 
leadership that supported him during the English Civil Wars.  From this 
integration, the ‗generals at sea‘ were able to bring more discipline to the Royal 
Navy with their ‗Fighting Instructions‘ and alignment of doctrine.146  This rapid 
transformation of the Royal Navy through a political champion, political 
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integration with military leadership, and doctrinal and technological innovation is 
an example of the speed at which military innovation can take place.  The 
success of this innovation is confirmed in the Anglo-Dutch Wars.   
The Convoy Act of 1650 provided English merchants with naval convoy 
protection, following the Dutch model.  An arms race for sea power ensued, with 
the Dutch building an additional 150 warships.  The Dutch ships outnumbered 
the English; however, the latter were professional naval ships, whereas the 
Dutch still built dual-purpose ships manned by armed merchantmen.  In the 
Anglo-Dutch Wars, the English adopted the doctrinal innovation of line-ahead 
firing formations, where ‗ships of the line‘ would move broadside of the enemy in 
order to deliver a maximum volley of firepower. 147  Although the Dutch adopted 
this line-ahead tactic and held their own through the three wars, especially the 
second, they were ultimately defeated at the battle of Gabbard Bank, ending the 
series of wars.  Both navies used line-ahead tactics, but wind and superior 
professionalism helped the English defeat the Dutch and establish themselves as 
the leading maritime power in the world.  Military innovations in sea power 
directly supported the political aims of the state, and the ‗virtuous triangle‘ was 
borne.   
Britain‘s grand strategy was not solely maritime-focused, but followed a 
grand strategy that hedged against continental threats.  Following the conclusion 
of the Thirty Years‘ War, and still somewhat in the throes of their own civil war, 
the English found themselves at war with France in 1702; Louis XIV attempting to 
establish absolute domination of the continent.  The English adopted many of the 
innovations of the Thirty Years‘ War, and combined them with audacious 
leadership to mitigate the French threat, while remaining focused on maritime 
dominance.  The English pursued a continental strategy that included military aid 
to countries on the continent that balanced against France—including their recent 
enemy, the Dutch—and supported campaigns that directly attacked France.148  
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The English New Model Army adopted the doctrinal innovation of drill, which had 
swept the continental militaries of the time.  They also adopted and furthered the 
technological innovations that had taken place with firearms, culminating in the 
invention of the Brown Bess in 1690.149  In the continental war with the French, 
the English formed a ‗Great Alliance‘ with Austria-Hungary.  When the Austrian 
capital of Vienna was threatened by French forces in 1704, John Churchill, the 
Duke of Marlborough, brought the English doctrinal and technological innovations 
to bear in defense of his country‘s allies.  Marlborough‘s March to the Danube 
represents one of the great deceptions of the age and secures his position as a 
great doctrinal innovator in his time.  He was able to save Vienna by conducting 
an operational deception in which he threatened Strasbourg—psychological key 
terrain for King Louis XIV—while turning his armies towards Vienna to attack the 
French forces there.150  This deception was possible only with a well-drilled 
army, skillful planning, robust logistics and leadership.  Marlborough was one of 
the most successful battlefield commanders prior to Napoleon, with successes 
culminating in a masterful deception at the siege of Bouchain seven years later.  
Although the internal politics of England at the time were in total ruin, the Queen 
and Parliament still managed to provide a grand strategy that supported a 
continental war against France, which provided the space and time to pursue 
maritime dominance of the world.  ―Geographical advantage and economic 
benefit were thus merged to enable the British brilliantly to pursue a Janus-faced 
strategy:  ‗with one face turned towards the Continent to trim the balance of 
power and the other directed at sea to strengthen her maritime dominance.‘‖151 
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5. Lessons From the Age of Mercantilism 
Only military resilience and technological innovation—especially the 
capital ship, infantry firepower and the artillery fortress:  the three 
vital components of the military revolution of the sixteenth century—
allowed the West to make the most of its smaller resources in order 
to resist and, eventually, to expand to global dominance.152   
Military might and economic strength became inextricably linked.  
Militaries became a tool of the state to increase its wealth, to not only protect its 
borders and extend its territorial holdings.  Timing also speeds up in this era—the 
Ottoman Empire rises to prominence with an advanced civilization, is challenged, 
and falls within three hundred years.  In an earlier age of less 
interconnectedness, the margin of advantage enjoyed by the Ottoman civilization 
would have sustained its power much longer.  The Ottoman Empire provides a 
perceptive lesson for the United States.  Like the Byzantine Empire, the 
Ottomans relied on the same institutions that made them a great power to 
maintain that power.  A centralized bureaucratic system built upon an advanced 
civilization allowed the expansion of the Ottoman Empire over diverse peoples 
and vast lands.  However, this same bureaucracy stifled innovation at the 
empire‘s zenith.  When forces were dispersed to remote distances, the internal 
failings of a sclerotic bureaucracy heightened the effects of imperial overreach 
and hastened the downfall of the empire.  The United States must heed the 
warning:  that when its power is at its maximum, and its forces are spread across 
the ecumene, it is not a time to centralize control and assume its own superiority.  
Only by decentralizing control in order to allow innovation to generate from 
within, will a great power maintain that position. 
The case of Siena, although not a great power, also holds lessons for the 
United States.  The small city-state used all of its resources to build an elaborate 
trace italienne—the preferred defensive system of the time.  However, the 
construction of this bastion was so expensive that Siena had no money to raise 
an army or naval forces.  After a long siege in 1555, the city-state surrendered 
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and was annexed by Florence.153  There is no ―silver bullet‖ in a state‘s 
protection of its society.  Adoption of technology that exhausts the state‘s 
resources in the name of national security, may result in its inability to protect its 
society.  Additionally, Sweden stands out as an anomaly is this era.  Unlike the 
mercantile powers of continental Europe, Sweden expands its empire for purely 
defensive means.154  Much of this expansion is based upon the massed volley 
fire innovation of its king and military commander, Gustavus Adolphus.  This 
singular innovation significantly changed the revolution in military affairs that 
occurred during this period and probably holds the origins of the later invention of 
the machine gun. 
Britain and France, in contrast to one another in this period, provide some 
of the most discerning lessons for America.  While each power spent much of its 
wealth on military might, only Britain developed a coherent national strategy that 
integrated its power.  The British ‗Janus-faced strategy‘ ensured geopolitical 
success through this period and well into the next.  It did this by alternately 
balancing with other powers against France and creating alliances that counter-
balanced forces looking to disrupt its power.  As France built a sizeable naval 
and land component, it failed to integrate these to reach maximum potential.  On 
the other hand, Britain, through a coherent national strategy, integrated its 
military forces to maintain and expand its power throughout the globe.  The 
United States must learn these lessons from Britain—not only does political 
integration of military power through a coherent strategy allow for rapid 
innovation of the military, but also horizontal integration of military services allows 
for the concerted application of military power and the increase of global power.  
In the First Period of Globalization, ―…technological and organizational 
innovation continued, allowing Europeans to outstrip other peoples of the earth  
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more and more emphatically until the globe-girdling imperialism of the nineteenth 
century became as cheap and easy for Europeans as it was catastrophic to 
Asians, Africans, and the peoples of Oceania.‖155 
D.  THE DISSOLUTION OF EMPIRES IN THE SECOND PERIOD OF 
GLOBALIZATION, 1800–2000 
If the First Period of Globalization can be described as ―Europe‘s Period,‖ 
then the Second Period of Globalization should be called ―America‘s Period.‖  
The two hundred years of this period saw a continuation of the European rise to 
global prominence, leading to two world wars that destroyed that rise and the 
empires it had created, followed by a superpower confrontation with global reach 
like the world had never seen, and culminating in a single dominant power that 
defied previous definitions.  The environment that created this rapid change was 
marked by an increasing rate of technological innovation—the naval innovation 
from wood and sail to dreadnoughts took over fifty years, while the development 
of the technology, doctrine, and organizations to support nuclear warfare took 
only fifteen years.156  In this environment, learning was easier and the diffusion of 
technological innovation was more rapid.  This increasing rate of technological 
innovation and sophistication was also attended by increasing costs.  In this 
environment, the extent of civil-military integration becomes paramount—as 
coherent national strategies will guide and check this rapid pace of innovation to 
meet the power goals of the country.  When the goals of the military lead the 
goals of the state, the tragedy of professional militarism occurs, as it did in Japan 
and Germany.  Conversely, when the military innovates in the absence of a 
coherent national strategy, it risks bankrupting the nation that it seeks to protect, 
as was the case with France.  In this period, once again Britain provided a model 
for the United States:  civil-military integration allowed rapid innovation of its 
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military through a coherent national strategy that created alliances where the 
country was weak and applied integrated military power where it was strong.   
As a result of the military revolution in Europe and the expansion of 
European countries into global empires in the First Period of Globalization, this 
period began with five great powers, all of which were European powers:  the 
Austrian Empire, France, the British Empire, Prussia, and the Russian Empire.  
In the two hundred years that followed, the Austrian Empire would dissolve into a 
middle, then a regional power and Italy and Japan would intermittently reach 
great power status.  These three powers will be briefly covered in the introduction 
below, while the countries that maintained great power status throughout the 
period will be discussed in the sections that follow.   
The Austrian Empire was a successor empire of the Hapsburg Empire 
discussed in the previous chapter.  As its successor, the Austrian Empire 
inherited the military innovations, and the geopolitical difficulties, of the Hapsburg 
Empire.  The Austrian Empire, later Austria-Hungary, was more diverse in 
cultures and languages than any other European power.  When the country 
deployed to war in 1914—the event that solidified its fall from great power 
status—the deployment order was given to its military in fifteen different 
languages.157  Nevertheless, the ethnic diversity itself was not a military 
problem—in fact, the army helped unify the country by skillfully integrating 
diverse ethnicities in its ranks.  Although the country developed a well-functioning 
bureaucracy, supported by and supporting an industrial capacity superior to 
many other powers of its time, this system failed to maintain a well-resourced 
military.  Due to its geography, ethnic diversity, and heritage, the Austrian Empire 
had many enemies, yet maintained the desire for great power status.  It failed to 
match these desires with military adaptation that would fulfill them.  By the end of 
the nineteenth century, Austria-Hungary was trying to maintain great power 
status, but only spending the resources of a second-rate power.158  This 
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mismatch was the result of a lack of civil-military integration:  the military 
leadership differed greatly with the emperor and the foreign ministry on the 
strategy to maintain Austrian power.  This lack of integration would be revealed in 
the First World War. 
Italy was a latecomer to the modern Great Power system with its 
unification in the 1860s.  However, its entrance into great power status does not 
suggest that it was on par with the other great powers of the time.  Italy‘s illiteracy 
rate of 37.6 percent reflected an agricultural society in an industrial era.159  There 
was a great disparity in the resource distribution between the more affluent north 
and the less industrialized south, and although the country had been unified in 
governance, it remained regionalized in outlook.  Its industrial capacity was a 
fraction of the capacity of the other great powers at the time.  From a geopolitical 
standpoint, Italy‘s greatest weakness was a near-complete divide between its 
military commanders and their civilian leadership.  With regional tensions 
preventing strategic deployment of the military, the latter was marginalized in 
resource allocation and public perception.  Italy did show some technological and 
doctrinal military innovations with the production of swift battleships and a 
successful irregular warfare component that innovated doctrine for divers and 
submarines.  However, the most illustrative point of Italian naval innovation in the 
interwar period is the debate over the building of a fleet to support grand 
strategy.  The Italian naval leadership divided into three camps in this debate:  
the innovatori (‗innovators‘) who argued for a navy built around light vessels and 
submarines; the ‗evolutionists‘ who wanted to retain battleships, but build a new 
capital ship as the nucleus for the navy; and the ‗die-hard‘ faction made up of the 
senior leadership of the navy who argued for the status quo.  The die-hard 
faction won the debate due to their seniority and sway with Mussolini.  The Italian 
navy did create better battleships, and especially naval special warfare doctrine, 
but the institutional inertia of the organization drove the navy towards the 
battleship as the capital ship, while the other great powers moved to the aircraft 
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carrier.160  The lack of integration of these battleships with both aircraft cover and 
ground operations made them singular cases of successful innovation, but 
insufficient to win the fight in the Mediterranean or maintain power status.  While 
other great powers in history were able to maintain that status through a societal 
innovation and industrial capacity that supported military innovation, Italy 
presents the antithesis of this reinforcing cycle—lack of industrial capacity, anti-
military sentiment among the population, and a divide between military 
commanders and civilian leaders made Italy the weakest and shortest duration 
great power in history. 
Italy presents the case of a divided society that fails to support the military, 
whereas Japan‘s rise to great power was the exact opposite.  The homogenous 
society of Japan, while under the control of the samurai culture, did not 
modernize in the First Period of Globalization.  However, this culture imbued the 
society with an ethos for integration that, coupled with the geographical isolation 
from the quarrelling western powers, allowed Japan to modernize and innovate in 
the Second Period of Globalization.  These factors only created the environment 
for innovation, the actual force behind this innovation were entrepreneurs in the 
Japanese social elite.  The Meiji Restoration in 1868 began the process of 
transforming Japan from an isolated imperial government and weak military 
power into a modern, industrial power supported by a strong military.161  In order 
to complete this transformation, the Japanese society realized the threat of 
western power encroachment in Asia and adopted the slogan, fukoku kyohei 
(‗rich country, with strong army‘).162  With this societal backing, Japanese leaders 
sent military commanders and industrial engineers alike to Europe in order 
gather the lessons of the industrial and military revolutions there.  The Japanese 
adopted the Prussian military organization and purchased modern weaponry, 
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while simultaneously building an organic weapons production capability.  They 
also quickly modernized the country‘s infrastructure with a rail network, 
telegraphs and shipping lines.163  The Japanese leadership‘s greatest innovation 
was aligning its society‘s goals with its military ones.  Once this alignment was 
effected by the social elites, the population supported spending resources to 
imitate the lessons of western powers while simultaneously building organic 
capacity. 
The fall of Japan from great power status is endemic of the period—it is a 
story of strategic overreach resulting from a lack of civil-military integration.  What 
began as a social mobilization to prevent western encroachment led, in the early 
1900s, to Japanese encroachment policies in pursuit of its own expansion.  As 
Japan expanded into Manchuria and Korea, it met and defeated the expansionist 
ambitions of the Russian Empire.  Japan‘s confirmation of great power status 
came with this victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.  Over the next four 
decades, Japan spread south and east into the resource-rich area of Indonesia in 
order to continue these expansionist aims and feed its continually modernizing 
economy.  When its empire expanded beyond the limits of its ability to maintain 
its sovereignty, it clashed with the allied powers in the Second World War—
losing great military status forever and great power status for fifty years. 
The Second Period of Globalization began with two existing great powers 
from the previous period, France and Great Britain, and witnessed the rise of 
Prussia into Germany, Russia into the Soviet Union then back to Russia, and the 
United States going from a divided country heading into civil war to a 
hyperpower.  This period also witnessed the failure, measured in catastrophic 
loss of life, of applying military doctrine from a previous era with the technology of 
the industrial revolution.  The Industrial Revolution was followed by a technology 
or information revolution that connected the world as it has never been 
previously—and may hold the same ominous lessons for the next century.  
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These factors will combine with the technological innovation of nuclear weapons 
to transform not only military doctrine, but the very nature of warfare as a 
component of state policy.   
1.   France (1799–1940) 
 Many countries throughout history have ensured alignment of foreign 
policy with military aims by having the leader of the country and the leader of the 
military be one in the same.  From the time of Sargon the Great, many leading 
powers were built on this model.  However, as states developed separate 
administrative and military systems throughout history, they tended to also 
develop leadership for each, with the Chinese first codifying the subordination of 
military power to civilian leadership.  In the previous period, Frederick the Great 
of Prussia rekindled this idea of a warrior-king, while the Second Period of 
Globalization produces the archetypal warrior-king in the person of Napoleon 
Bonaparte. 
 The French Revolution left France with a modernized political system, a 
strong foundation for field armies and an ideological fervor to motivate the 
soldiers.164  Napoleon seized power in 1799, adopted a geopolitical objective 
similar to Louis XIV‘s in the preceding period, and maximized his well-trained 
military to this end.  Also in line with the preceding period, one European state‘s 
increase in power caused the other states to balance against it.  Throughout his 
reign, Napoleon was in constant conflict with Britain, Prussia and Russia; 
ultimately meeting defeat at their hands.  The Congress of Vienna in 1815 
marked the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of a new era in 
European politics.165  In the years between Napoleon‘s final defeat at Waterloo 
and the rise of his nephew, Napoleon III, France reverted to a monarchy, and 
then re-established a republic in multiple civil uprisings.  Following Prussia‘s 
defeat of Austria-Hungary in 1866, Napoleon III recalculated his foreign policy to 
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resist further Prussian expansion, but he was unable to restructure his military to 
support this policy.166  France was defeated first in 1871 by the Germans, and 
then suffered greatly in both world wars at the hands of its German neighbors.  
However, throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, France 
continued to expand its global empire—second only to the British Empire in the 
early part of this period.  After losing territorial claims in North America and the 
Caribbean to the British and Americans, France expanded its colonies into 
Indochina and Africa.  
 Despite the dramatic political upheaval that occurred at the end of the 
eighteenth century, the tenets that made the French Army successful in the 
previous period continued in this period.  The French Army that Napoleon 
assumed command of in 1799 was broken by years of revolution and lack of 
unity, but the members of the military were veterans of the revolutionary wars 
and instilled with the values of drill and training from the previous period.  
Napoleon built on this foundation with the concept of levée en masse, which 
capitalized on the revolutionary fervor of the people and the population 
advantage that France had over its European competitors.  This concept allowed 
scaling up of forces to sizes such as no military in history was previously able to 
accomplish.  Napoleon‘s greatest organizational innovation was the Army Corps.  
His Grande Armee was organized into all-arms groups that could act 
independently or in support of one another.167  By arranging these groups into 
close-order marching formations, called battalion squares, each corps could 
maneuver to support another, alternating positions as vanguard, flank guard, or 
rear guard.  The success of this innovation was demonstrated against the 
Prussians at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt in 1806.  Added to this revived 
military strength was the grand strategy genius of Napoleon—not only in the 
innovations described above, but also in national policy.  Napoleon‘s ―Continental 
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System‖ was a trade ban imposed on his greatest competitor, Great Britain.168  
This system attacked Britain‘s center of gravity, the global trade that supported 
the island‘s disproportionate national power.  Napoleon waged economic warfare 
on the British; enlisting the continental satellite states he had acquired to cripple 
the British economy.  The successes of Napoleon and the Grande Armee paved 
the way for a broader expansion of the French Empire, but held the seeds of 
eventual downfall. 
 Following expansion into Africa with the establishment of Algeria as a 
French colony in 1830 and still riding the success of the innovations in the 
Napoleonic Wars, the French Army of the later nineteenth century grew 
complacent.  The military staff was bureaucratized to the point of resisting 
changes that Napoleon III sought in 1866.  Their system had deteriorated 
significantly, with a General Staff completely detached from the field units, a 
broken logistical system, and professional military education system that allowed 
illiterate officers to serve.169  The army had also failed to adopt the repeating 
rifle—a key technological innovation that changed the doctrines of many 
militaries of the time.  The indication of this fall from preeminence came with the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871.  The French military was beaten soundly 
and rapidly by a superior Prussian army and a superior logistical system based 
on the advanced Prussian railway.  This defeat and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine 
by the French directly contributed to France joining the Triple Entente in World 
War I—realizing loss of organic power, the French had to ally with previous 
enemies to maintain some power and its sovereignty.  The result of France‘s 
Pyrrhic victory in World War I, was a war-weary country and military.  This 
directly led to French the innovation of defensive doctrine, which was initiated 
from within the military and supported by the civilian leadership.170  This doctrinal 
innovation, and the technological innovation that supported it—the Maginot 
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Line—shows the ―neutral value‖ of innovation.  The French defensive doctrine in 
the interwar years, and its reliance on the Maginot line reflect the fact that 
change is not always positive.  In some cases, innovation can create a false 
sense of security and lead directly to one‘s defeat, as the French initially 
experienced in the Second World War.  
 In the period between 1815 and 1870, the French status as a great power, 
albeit second at this time to British power, was still unquestionable—with Britain 
maintaining a remarkably small army and Germany yet to unify and pose an 
existential threat.  Yet, during this period of French global power, the military 
became complacent and allowed a deterioration of the institutions that previously 
made it successful.  A crumbling professional military education system failed to 
produce leaders that were able to continue innovating for power maintenance.  
Even when a leader saw the need to innovate, as did Napoleon III, the 
bureaucratic military leadership failed to heed his warnings and blocked his 
initiatives.  Complacency and lack of innovation led to the army‘s complete failure 
at the hands of an innovative and well-organized Prussian force.  This defeat 
began the decline of French global power, which continued through two World 
Wars and a dissolving empire.  The lessons for the American military are 
apparent.  A bureaucratic military leadership that resists the changes of its 
civilian leadership can directly threaten the power of the country.  However, 
change, in and of itself, is not always positive.  The war-weariness of the French 
military led to the adoption of a defensive doctrine in the interwar years.  While 
this was an innovation, when measured against the offensive innovations of the 
German Army, it proved to be a failing one.  This case again highlights why civil-
military integration of a national strategy that accounts for the strengths of rising 




2. Britain (1800–1950) 
―If the Punjabis and Annamese and Sioux and Bantu were the ‗losers‘…in 
this early-nineteenth-century expansion, the British were undoubtedly the 
‗winners.‘‖171  In the nineteenth century, Britain was the preeminent mercantile 
power in the world due to, ―their adroit combination of naval mastery, financial 
credit, commercial expertise, and alliance diplomacy.‖172  While Britain was not 
affected as directly as France or Austria by the unification of Germany, this new 
power did pose a threat to British economic hegemony—as did the rising power 
of Russia and the United States.  By the end of the nineteenth-century, Britain‘s 
global power preeminence was dissipating with the diffusion of technology from 
the Industrial Revolution and the consequential rise of new power competitors.  
While the British economic output was still growing at the turn of the century, it 
was losing in relative terms—its share of world trade shrank from 23.2% in 1880 
to 14.1% in the period 1911–1913.173  The British growth model shows the 
deficiencies of relying on economic power alone to sustain national power, while 
conversely showing the ability of an extremely wealthy country to ‗buy‘ military 
power when the time comes for war. 
Britain was unique in that it possessed far less land-based military power 
than its global preeminence would suggest.  Notwithstanding the Royal Navy, 
which was designed to exceed the combined capability of the next two most 
powerful navies, Britain‘s absolute military might was far less than its relative 
strength.  For this reason, Britain presents an interesting case of a power that 
was not only able to maintain great power status, but able to maintain power 
preeminence with significantly less military strength, relative to its continental 
competitors, through cost-effective military innovation.  Britain‘s establishment of 
a Royal Navy and subsequent building of this navy for the express purpose of 
surpassing any two of the existing navies at the time resulted directly in its great 
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power status from 1714 to 1914.174  This translation of sea power into national 
power was codified by Alfred Thayer Mahan in his 1890 work, The Influence of 
Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783, in which he credited Britain‘s global power 
status directly to their control of the seas.175  Mahan‘s work would spur the 
expansion and innovation of American, German and Japanese naval forces in 
the years before World War I.  What is unique about British military innovation, as 
the preeminent global power in the years leading up to World War I, is that it is 
relatively non-existent.  Yet, Britain was able to win the war with help from its 
allies and maintain its great power status.   
Britain presents an exceptional case in which it surpassed the power of 
France in the nineteenth-century, after defeating Napoleon at Waterloo, to 
become the greatest power in the world.  It then focused its efforts on colonial 
expansion, while other powers on the European continent vied for advantage 
against each other.  With relative little expenditure on land forces, and an 
extraordinary market share of global trade, Britain dramatically increased its 
wealth while not expending that wealth on a standing army.  Even though its 
army deteriorated during this time, Britain was able to make up for its relative 
weakness in the First World War with its garnered wealth and vastly superior 
naval forces.  In the interwar years, Britain would show more military innovation 
in preparation for the Second World War. 
In the interwar period, it would take civilian intervention in Britain to create 
the Royal Air Force, as well as its Fighter Command air defense system.  The 
organizational innovation of the Royal Air Force highlights the tendency of 
military organizations to resist innovation, which occasionally requires the 
intervention of civilian leadership to facilitate it.  However, the Royal Air Force 
itself was responsible for the doctrinal innovation of strategic bombing.  Because 
the RAF was an entirely new organization, there was no existing doctrine posing 
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the institutional inertia that sometimes prevents doctrinal innovation.  Yet, even 
with this lack of inertia, the RAF did not transform strategic bombing from a 
concept into set doctrine until war with Germany forced this transformation.176  
The doctrinal innovation of strategic bombing shows the advantages to 
innovation created by a new organization that has no doctrinal inertia to 
overcome.  However, the fact that the RAF failed to codify this doctrine shows 
the resistance of innovation in military organizations without external pressure.  
In the case of the establishment of the RAF that external pressure was British 
civilian leadership; in the case of acceptance of a new doctrine that external 
pressure was the existential threat of an offensive Germany. 
The decline of Britain in world power is an interesting case, as well.  
Unlike the dramatic fall of Napoleon or the dissolution of the Roman Empire, the 
British decline can be measured in relative terms.  While technically Britain 
maintains great power status throughout this period—with permanent 
membership on the United Nations Security Council—in the first fifty years of the 
twentieth century, Britain falls from the greatest power in the world to a distant 
third behind the United States and the Soviet Union.  Having established a world 
empire of colonies during the age of sail, Britain successfully industrialized this 
empire and maintained global power through the Industrial Revolution—using the 
technology of the revolution to expand its colonial power and wealth.  Yet the first 
chink in the British armor became evident with the loss of the American Colonies 
in the War of American Rebellion.  Conversely, a hundred years later, the Boer 
and Matabele wars begin to sour British society‘s taste for colonialism.177  As 
Britain remained focused on its colonies as its major source of revenue, the rise 
of Prussia into Germany would shape the course of world events for the next fifty 
years.  Rising powers such as Japan, the United States, and Russia, which were 
neither over-extended empires nor facing existential threats, would build military 
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forces to rival those of Britain, and eventually overcome the latter‘s power.  The 
United States can garner lessons from Britain‘s cost-effective military innovation.  
The resources dedicated to defense spending may wax and wane through the 
years, as more or less money is dedicated to building national wealth in other 
areas.  However, the decreased spending on military might may be offset with 
strategic alliance formation and an innovative society that allows for the scaling 
up of military power in times of need. 
3. Prussia and Germany (1772–1945) 
 At the end of the First Period of Globalization, not only a warrior-king who 
was able to align grand strategy with military strategy, but also a great innovator 
ruled Prussia.  Frederick the Great was directly responsible for Prussia‘s rise to 
great power through his military innovations and his political acumen.178  The 
legacy that he left would shape the geopolitics and military of Prussia and 
Germany for centuries.  However, military means were not solely responsible for 
Prussia‘s rise to power.  The state was economically stable, compared to both its 
other German confederates and its European neighbors, and administered its 
affairs through an efficient bureaucratic system.179   Following its decisive defeat 
of France in the Franco-Prussian War, Prussia joined with the other German 
states to form the German Empire in 1871; a unique monarchy supported by a 
well-functioning bureaucracy.  The empire‘s first Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, 
continued in the military traditions of Prussia, while simultaneously avoiding war 
in Europe as he isolated France and maintained a balance of power on the 
continent.  He warned against unabated German militarism that could lead to 
world war.  His warnings were ignored by the new Emperor, Wilhelm II, and the 
German Empire set a course that led to World War I.  The Treaty of Versailles,  
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which ended World War I, would pave the way for a new German militaristic 
leader, Adolf Hitler, who would directly cause World War II in pursuit of 
lebensraum and world domination. 
 King Frederick II (the Great) was one of the great doctrinal innovators of 
his time.  He established an officer corps based on the Junker landed nobility of 
Prussia then matched this corps with a well-drilled army.  This extraordinary 
military, combined with his tactical genius and doctrinal innovations, allowed 
Frederick to secure great power status for Prussia.180  In one example of his 
doctrinal innovation, the Battle of Leuthen in 1757, Frederick routed the Austrians 
by utilizing a feint infantry attack against the main line of the Austrian forces, 
while using the majority of his force and artillery to roll up the Austrian flank.181  
Frederick termed this maneuver the Attack in Oblique Order.  In this fashion, he 
completed the transition from mass warfare to maneuver warfare begun by 
Epaminondas fourteen hundred years earlier.  His doctrinal innovations would be 
studied and employed by Napoleon fifty years later and would lay the 
groundwork for Napoleonic-style tactics. 
 The efficiency and strength of the Prussian army cost four-fifths of the 
country‘s revenue, but this cost was manageable due to resource rich areas that 
Frederick conquered and the efficient bureaucracy that turned these resources, 
and later industrial capacity, into revenue production for the state.  Additionally, 
there was an organizational innovation in Prussia to use foreign soldiers and 
entrepreneurs for the improvement of the military and the economy.182  The 
innovation of external entrepreneurs and efficient bureaucracy facilitated the 
construction of an industrial infrastructure like no other in Europe.  By 1866, 
Prussia displayed the ability to mobilize a million-man army, move it by rail to 
meet the enemy, and successfully command this force in battle.183  This 
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innovation and efficiency led to Prussia‘s success over France in 1871.  Later, 
after German leadership had long-since dismissed the warnings of Bismarck to 
staunch the militarism of Germany, Alfred von Tirpitz proved the chancellor 
correct.  Tirpitz innovated an organizational plan to build up the German Navy, 
based on imitating the technological inventions of others—while his strategy was 
somewhat unique, he applied the technology of battleships to this strategy, rather 
than capitalizing on the new technology of submarines.  Tirpitz‘s ‗Risk Theory‘ 
was based on the idea that a navy need not be as strong as to take on every 
opponent, but rather be strong enough so that the cost of defeating that navy by 
one‘s enemy would weaken the enemy enough to be susceptible to third party 
attacks.184  As with the French innovation of defensive doctrine and the Maginot 
Line, this innovation turned out to be a failed one.  While trying to firmly establish 
Germany as a great power through the development of a powerful navy, Tirpitz 
set off an arms race with the British that contributed to the outbreak of the First 
World War and the loss of German power.  In line with a theme of this period of 
globalization—the increased pace of learning and technological diffusion—this 
arms race allowed imitation of technological developments by both militaries.  
This theme only further highlights the need for frequent and continued innovation 
as the rate of diffusion of technology increases. 
 Possibly the greatest German military innovation was the development of 
Blitzkrieg Doctrine in the interwar years.  This innovation incorporated the 
technological innovation of tanks into new organizations that allowed for fast 
offensive movement; contrasted with the French who parceled tanks out to 
existing formations.  The blitzkrieg doctrine—as with the establishment of the 
Royal Air Force in Britain—required civilian intervention for adoption, which is 
surprising given the offensive predilections of the German Army.185  However, 
the German Army initially sought to apply new technology to old offensive 
doctrinal concepts rather than innovate the doctrine to maximize the 
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effectiveness of the technology.  This inertia had to be broken by civilian 
intervention to force the Army to develop its greatest doctrinal innovation.  The 
contrast between the French and German approaches to incorporating 
technological innovation is telling for any military.  The opening battles of World 
War II show that technological innovation alone is not enough to increase the 
strength of a military.  This new technology must be incorporated into doctrinal, 
and sometimes organizational, changes to maximize its effectiveness.  Interwar 
Germany also displayed a well-integrated inter-service component, with 
battlefield cooperation between the army and air force; less so between the 
Luftwaffe and the German Navy.  Germany displayed a much closer integration 
of service components than either France or Britain, which both experienced 
significant service rivalry for budget share.186  Hitler, in the opening phase of 
World War II conducted a doctrinal innovation in the form of strategic deception.  
Capitalizing on the power of unitary state and military heads, Hitler was able to 
conduct Operation Barbarossa to allow early success of his military campaign.  
This deception operation combined diplomatic deception, in the form of Russo-
German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, with the military capability of the German 
Blitzkrieg, to afford Hitler initial success in the surprise attack of Russia.187 
 Why did the German combination of doctrinal, organizational, and 
technological innovation not facilitate maintenance of great power status?  This 
innovative military did succeed in raising Prussia, then Germany, to great power 
status in the short term.  However, the story of Germany‘s decline probably 
begins with the death of Bismarck.  This able politician understood the power, 
and the danger, of German militarism and sought political balancing to reduce its 
threat.  When Bismarck died, first Wilhelm II and then Hitler, allowed unabated 
militarism to fuel their pursuit of world domination.  In two world wars, the rising 
industrial powers of Russia and, especially, the United States would ensure this 
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domination dream was not fulfilled.  In the process, these two industrial giants 
would transform economic capacity into military might to create a new category 
of great power—the superpower. 
4. Russia and the Soviet Union (1721–1989) 
In geopolitical terms, Russia became a factor in European power politics 
during the Seven Years War.  Yet, the eighteenth and nineteenth century‘s global 
powers were sea powers and empire of colonies.  While Russia maintained a key 
power position on the European continent, it did not contend with Britain or 
France globally.188  Under Peter the Great, Russia was recognized as an empire 
in 1721 and Catherine the Great oversaw the Age of Russian Enlightenment from 
1762 to 1796.  Sea power began in the early nineteenth-century, but the Russian 
Empire remained economically backward and slow to innovate its industrial 
capacity through the Industrial Revolution.  Despite this, the sheer volume of 
resources—including personnel to field armies—and its status as a ‗gunpowder 
empire‘ allowed Russia to fend off horsed tribes from the east and pose a 
considerable risk to the west.189  When Napoleon‘s strategic overreach carried 
his forces into Russia in the early nineteenth-century, the massive Russian Army, 
coupled with irregular forces such as the Cossacks, pushed him all the way back 
to Paris.  The Russian officers of the Napoleonic campaign returned home with 
liberal ideas for reforming the tsarist state.  For the next one hundred years, 
Russia underwent periodic internal revolts while maintaining great power 
seemingly through size and resources alone.  The high costs of personnel and 
resources in the First World War led the Russian population to become 
disenfranchised with the government and set the conditions for the Bolshevik 
Revolution.  This revolution ushered in a new era in the international system and 
the United Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in 1922.  First Vladimir Lenin 
and later Joseph Stalin, transformed the Soviet Union in the interwar years 
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through industrialization of the economy and collectivization of its huge 
agricultural resources to support the largest land force of World War II.  Following 
the largest invasion in human history by Germany, the Soviet Union was able to 
repel the German attack at an immense cost of life and resources.  However, the 
Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War as a global superpower, 
dividing the world between the United States and itself in a global balance of 
power. 
In the realm of specific military innovation that supported Russian 
geopolitics, Peter the Great was the first and most prominent innovator in the 
period of Russian great power.  Upon entrance into the Great Northern War 
against Sweden, Peter realized the inferiority of the Russian military and began a 
modernization program to create a navy and improve an army through well-
drilled infantry tactics and use of artillery.  The Russian navy began construction 
of smaller galley ships, in an era when large warships were the focus of most 
powers, and began parallel construction of a canal system that maximized the 
effectiveness of these galleys.  Most importantly, Peter began a process of 
militarization that provided industry for the fledgling empire and a focus for 
maximizing the industrial production of the empire towards a specific goal.  This 
foundation led to a large standing force equipped and drilled in modern 
techniques, a naval component doctrinally organized for small galley craft and a 
canal system that would prove decisive almost a century later.190   
When Napoleon invaded Russia, he had already stretched his logistical 
supply lines across Europe.  The Russian Army, on the other hand, were not only 
fighting on home territory, but also had doctrinally innovated a logistical supply 
based on the internal canals and rivers.  Napoleon‘s forces could not move 
supplies by cart, and therefore could not maneuver, as quickly as the Russian 
Army using the waterborne logistical resupply.191  This innovation, combined with 
the overwhelming mass of the Russian Army and the formidable weather, 
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allowed the Russians to stop Napoleon‘s expansionist ambitions and push him all 
the way back to Paris.  This campaign confirmed Russia as the greatest land 
power in Europe.  Although it experienced numerous other campaigns 
throughout the nineteenth-century, the Russian Army innovated very little, but 
instead relied on its mass to maintain power.  The Russian Navy did innovate 
somewhat with the industrial revolution, but still lagged behind the capability of 
the British and French navies of the time—a trend that would continue for the 
next century.192  This inconsistent innovation would become evident in the 
Crimean War, when French and British naval power sustained logistical resupply 
that could not be matched even by the Russian masses, yet technological and 
doctrinal innovation allowed the Russians to destroy Ottoman forces at Sinop.  
This war effectively reversed the trend of the Napoleonic campaign—showing the 
importance of logistics in both cases, but the failure of the Russians to continue 
innovation that would support its massed armies away from the homeland.  The 
Crimean War also provides an example of when technological innovation alone 
can be decisive in battle.  The British and French armies were using the rifled 
musket with a range of 1,000 yards, while the innovatively inconsistent Russian 
military still used the smoothbore musket with a 200-yard range. 193 
The lack of Russian military innovation continued into the First World War.  
Able to overwhelm enemies with mass and resource superiority, Russian military 
leaders saw little need to innovate.  In World War I, this mass did still prove 
decisive against Hapsburg and Austrian militaries, but was insufficient to defeat 
the well-trained troops and well-planned operations of the German military.  As 
the war developed into a total war, Russian political leadership ‗outsourced‘ 
munitions production to groups of business leaders.  These businesses were 
able to dramatically increase munitions production to support the war effort, but 
had the unintended consequence of causing massive inflation.194  The social 
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consequences of this organizational innovation laid the groundwork for the 
Bolshevik Revolution.  The collapse of the Russian Army at the end of World War 
I marked the high-point of massed conscripted armies.  Completing the cycle 
begun by Napoleon over one hundred years earlier, in which he translated 
revolutionary fervor into massed military might, the limits of this ability were 
displayed by the collapse of a Russian military that was worn by war and 
politically fragmented.195  It would take a leader equally adept at political and 
military innovation to maintain the power of the Russian state. 
Vladimir Lenin artfully mixed a compelling information campaign with 
active armed revolution to overthrow the Provisional Government of Russia.  
Lenin‘s timing at the end of the First World War capitalized on the massive losses 
that Russia had sustained and the population‘s disaffection with the ruling 
elites.196  From this political chaos, Lenin established a Soviet system to provide 
health care, education, and civil rights.  The military innovation of Leninism was 
to see that, organizationally and doctrinally, the military was no longer a subset of 
the state, but could be a direct extension of it.  In the communist Soviet Union, 
politics and military were inextricably linked—military leaders were required to be 
part of the political leadership as well.  This phenomenon created a dramatic 
social shift that forced the innovation of the military to support the ideology of the 
state.  
Under the draconian policies of Josef Stalin, the Soviet Union established 
a command economy.  Although these policies had devastating effects on the 
population, they resulted in the most rapid transformation from an agricultural 
economy to an industrialized one in history; graduate engineers in the Soviet 
Union rose from 47,000 in 1928 to 289,000 in 1941.197  In the late 1930s, the 
threatening global environment and Stalin‘s own paranoia caused a militarization 
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of the Soviet Union.  Although Stalinist policies stifled innovation in most other 
realms, Soviet military leaders studied western theorists and were able to 
innovate doctrinally.  This doctrinal innovation was supported by a state-run 
industry that produced tanks and aircraft faster than most other powers 
combined.198 
The Soviet machine focused on quantity over quality.  The rapid 
expansion of its military forces and weaponry prior to World War II focused on 
Soviet ‗gigantism.‘199  Due to Stalin‘s purges of military leadership, the quality of 
the Soviet military was almost wholly reliant on its size at the outset of World War 
II.  That it was able to maintain power during the war is a credit to its ‗gigantism,‘ 
its production abilities, its political alliances, and its harsh geography.  The cracks 
in the Soviet system that undergirded this lack of quality would increase over the 
next fifty years to eventually cause the downfall of the entire communist system.  
The same advantages afforded by a centralized bureaucracy that facilitated the 
Soviet Union‘s industrialization and militarization prior to World War II, also 
allowed it to quickly adopt a new offensive doctrine supported by nuclear 
weapons.  The industrial capability of the country sped production of nuclear 
weapons—directly responsible for an arms race with the United States that 
shaped the very concept of warfare.  In a classic example of military doctrine 
undermining the state it is created to protect, the cost of building the nuclear 
capability to support USSR‘s offensive doctrine helped speed the dissolution of 
the state itself.200  The Russia-Soviet Union-Russia cycle of rise and decline 
provides another lesson for America alongside those of Japan and Germany.  
The Bolshevik Revolution ushered in an era of militarism that was successful in 
World War II against the German threat.  This military success bred an 
environment in which the civil-military integration was tipped to the side of 
militarism.  As with the Assyrians and Spartans of an earlier era, unchecked 
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militarism can directly cause the downfall of the society it seeks to protect.  While 
the Soviet Union maintained civil-military integration to a degree that blurred the 
lines between the two, the pursuit of the military goals caused the downfall of the 
state.  Facing the United States, and needing to build not only nuclear weapons, 
but also a huge conventional force, the Soviet Union‘s focus on defense 
overburdened an economic system that was too weak to support it.  While civil-
military integration is imperative to maintenance of great power, the balance of 
this integration must always tip in favor of the civilian side.  Otherwise, even a 
well-intentioned military can spend its country into economic ruin and power 
decline. 
5. The United States (1898–Present) 
 The United States‘ geographical isolation allowed it to develop industrially 
and economically, while remaining detached from the nineteenth-century wars in 
Europe.  It became a great power in this period primarily because of its rich 
natural resource base and its relative lead in industrialization, unhampered by 
great power war.  Save for the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, in which he 
attempted to take a more active engagement in world politics, America remained 
isolationist until the First World War, and again afterward.  On the eve of World 
War I, ―the United States had definitely become a Great Power.  But it was not 
part of the Great Power system.‖201  The United States was so little a part of the 
great power system that most European powers did not factor its might into the 
alliance system, which began World War I.  The American entrance into World 
War I was not decisive because of its military capability, but rather its productive 
capability.  Its industrial potential and manufacturing output was more than twice 
that of Germany‘s, while its military forces remained small and unprepared for 
modern warfare.202  Yet America emerged from the First World War as the 
world‘s greatest financial and creditor nation—replacing Britain place in this role 
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in pre-war years.203  Following the Washington Conference Treaty System, the 
United States again adopted its isolationist foreign policy.  This policy included 
the trade protectionism of the 1930s that, combined with the Great Depression, 
damaged the American economy more than any other in the world.  This 
isolationism predictably caused a sharp reduction in military forces in the interwar 
period.  In the late 1930‘s America began ramping up production of war materiel 
for sale to Britain, which would facilitate its own rapid military growth after the 
attack on Pearl Harbor.  The Second World War convinced most Americans that 
an isolationist policy was no longer feasible and the country quickly slid into a 
Cold War with the Soviet Union. 
 The bloodiest war in America‘s history, the Civil War, may explain much of 
the isolationist feelings of Americans up to and after the First World War.  The 
Civil War holds some evidence of American military innovation, especially in 
doctrine and technology.  The use of telegraphs and railways to coordinate troop 
movements over long distances was a direct product of the Industrial Revolution.  
Lincoln, a proponent of new technology, turned these technological inventions 
into doctrinal innovations.  Lincoln combined the political-military integration 
necessary to eventually find a general to command the Union Army who could 
successfully integrate the technology with doctrine to capitalize on Northern 
advantages in industry and manpower.  This strategy became the cordon 
offensive that Grant successfully conducted against the South.204  Additionally, 
some of the raiding and skirmishing tactics used—especially by Confederate 
officers such as Mosby—continued a tradition of irregular warfare begun by 
Nathaniel Greene in the American Revolution.  This continuing doctrinal 
innovation showed signs of superiority over accepted Napoleonic tactics, in light 
of rifled muskets and more accurate fire.  These irregular tactics would be further 
flushed out in the Spanish American War and the Frontier Wars with the Native 
Americans.  One remarkable case of doctrinal innovation was the U.S. Marine 
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Corps‘ Small Wars Manual published in 1940.  This manual was a one-of-a-kind 
doctrinal innovation produced from the ‗bottom-up.‘  It codified lessons learned by 
marines in guerrilla campaigns and insurgencies of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and represents one of only a few doctrinal innovations in 
history that was generated not from an imaginative leader, but rather from the 
collective lessons of the soldier-rank.  However, the institutional knowledge and 
appreciation for these tactics would be lost in the twentieth century U.S. military, 
resulting in defeats in Korea and Vietnam. 
In 1890, Mahan predicted the end of the British command of the seas and 
tried to prepare the United States to assume that role.205  Mahan‘s ideas directly 
influenced the rising powers of Germany and Japan, as well, and in the United 
States, his work found a political champion in the person of Theodore Roosevelt. 
Roosevelt created the Great White Fleet, then used this technological and 
organizational innovation as a linchpin of his foreign policy, ‗walk softly and carry 
a big stick.‘  America‘s productive capacity allowed it to support Britain with war 
materiel prior to World War I, and also allowed rapid expansion of its own military 
upon the decision to enter the war.  When the United States began building a 
fleet to take part in World War I, and then codified naval parity with the British in 
the Washington Treaty System of 1922, it marked the assumption of America as 
the world‘s naval power and the world hegemonic power.206  Mahan‘s wishes 
had been fulfilled.   
In the interwar years, the United States, in line with its isolationist foreign 
policy greatly reduced its military strength.  By the end of the Great Depression, 
―the United States was spending less on armaments than Britain or Japan, and 
only a fraction of the sums spent by Germany and the Soviet Union.‖207  
Additionally, its army had no tanks, so that when war in Europe broke out, the 
U.S. military was wholly unprepared to enter it.  Fortunately, the groundwork had 
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been laid to allow rapid scaling up of U.S. military forces.  In 1938, Congress 
passed the ―Navy Second to None‖ Act, which authorized dramatic expansion of 
the fleet.  Also, the Army Air Corps had tested the B-17 Bomber and the Marines 
had developed refined amphibious warfare doctrine.208  These preparations, 
even with a lack of resourcing, laid the groundwork for the U.S. military to rapidly 
expand its capacity and maximize the country‘s latent industrial capability to 
quickly enter the war. 
During World War II several doctrinal and organizational innovations took 
place in the U.S. military.  Imitating the innovation of the German airborne 
doctrine, the American military tested and then created two divisions of 
paratrooper infantry.  In another organizational innovation, the U.S. military 
rekindled its irregular warfare tactics to create the Office of Strategic Services—
an organization that conducted sabotage, subversion and reconnaissance behind 
enemy lines with indigenous personnel.  America‘s most important innovation of 
World War II was a technological one—the development of the nuclear weapon.  
This weapon‘s development not only ended the war when it was used against 
Japan, but also set the stage for a nuclear arms race for the next forty years.  
More importantly, the development of the nuclear weapon displayed the power of 
an innovative military working in tandem with an innovative society.  As the 
Chinese had done centuries earlier, the United States was able to mobilize it 
society to the war effort and create a sense of innovation within that society 
during World War II.  That many perceived Germany‘s fascist ambitions for world 
domination as an existential threat may have aided this mobilization.  
Regardless, the organization of the Manhattan Project joined the best scientific 
minds of American society to work on a military aim.  This societal-military 
innovation loop created the seeds for later organizations such as DARPA and 
NASA.  The civil-military integration that resulted would allow the United States to 
continue societal and military innovation towards a common goal throughout the 
Cold War. 
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Following the end of World War II, the United States‘ demonstrated 
capability of nuclear weapons led the other resultant superpower, the Soviet 
Union, to quickly develop this capability.  The arms race reached a peak in 1962, 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The specter of thermonuclear war shaped 
global power politics until the fall of the Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, 
beyond.  This one technological innovation ensured that all proxy wars during 
this period would remain limited in nature.  While the U.S. military would slowly 
adapt to respond to the conventional military threat across the Fulda Gap, it 
would engage in several wars during this same period that required a wholly 
different type of organizational structure.  Yet it would fail to understand the need 
for this organizational innovation and would fight irregular wars with regular 
formations.  The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the United States as the sole 
superpower.  Yet, like militaries of the past, the ‗success‘ of the U.S. military in 
the Cold War does not signal a time to maintain the status quo, but rather a 
period in which increased innovation is necessary.  The resounding success of 
the U.S. military over Iraq in Operation Desert Storm (not a ‗tough test‘ of 
American power), only served to reinforce the opinions of those who felt that no 
change was needed in the dominant military of the time.  However, America‘s 
position as a global hegemon quickly began to resemble that of Britain in the late 
nineteenth century.  Although its power was not declining in any measurable 
form, its competitors were rising in relative terms across military, political, and 
especially economic realms.  In this time of globalization and increasingly rapid 
technological innovation, more frequent change was necessary in a world that 
dissolved from two rival superpowers, to an ecumene of rising competitors—both 
states and non-state actors. 
6. Lessons from the Age of Overstretch 
 The Second Period of Globalization saw dramatic shifts at the 
international system level.  Empires that had overextended were fraying at the 
margins.  Technological innovation, which increased in frequency and diffusion, 
started showing the limit of its power as irregular forces altered doctrine and 
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organization to counteract it—such as the Matabele in South Africa or the Viet 
Cong in South Vietnam.  Ideological revolutions that altered the political 
landscape of countries and regions directly affected the whole constitution of the 
militaries in those areas, as in the Soviet Union.  The German rapid innovation in 
doctrine, organization, and technology to formulate the Blitzkrieg proved initially 
successful, but this innovation was limited in its ability to sustain great power.  
The limitation was the national strategy to which it was employed—overreaching 
strategies of global domination proved even more disastrous to the militaries that 
pursued them than the overreaching empire strategies of a previous era.  
Most importantly, the Second Period of Globalization highlights the 
nuances of civil-military integration.  German fascism, Japanese imperialism and 
the Soviet Union provide examples of highly integrated civil and military affairs.  
Unlike earlier failing powers, their fault was not in lack of integration, but in the 
balance of it.  In each of these three countries, the military component built upon 
initial success—often as a result of successful innovation—to rise to prominence 
within its own system.  When this unabated militarism took place, both Germany 
and Japan allowed national strategies of empire expansion to overstretch their 
resources.  Both militaries built on early innovative victories—the Blitzkrieg in 
Germany and the Japanese aircraft carrier attack doctrine—to further the 
militarism in their respective governments.  Ultimately, this overreach caused the 
backlash of an alliance of stronger powers.  The case of the Soviet Union is 
similar, but over a longer period.  The militarism that arose directly from Lenin 
and Stalin caused the Soviet Union to fall, not in a world war, but under the 
weight of its own system.  As with Germany and Japan, civil-military integration 
was high, but the balance of military control in the system was too high for the 
country to sustain.  Racing a wealthy American economy built on a capitalist 
model in a technologically sophisticated nuclear and conventional arms race, the 
pace of military innovation in the Soviet Union proved too rapid for the economy 
to support.  The breakdown of the social-military innovation feedback process 
caused the dissolution of the country. 
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The lessons for the United States are numerous and poignant.  In an era 
of rapid technological change and globalization, a military must remain 
innovative.  Yet the military‘s innovation must not occur in a vacuum.  To be 
transformative to national power, it must feed and be fed by a system including 
social innovation.  Most important for the U.S. military are the nuances of civil-
military relations.  Integration of the military into a broader national strategy is 
required to both guide and bound its innovation, lest the aims of a well-
intentioned military directly undermine the power of the state.  The civilian 
leadership responsibility is to provide this coherent strategy to allow military 
innovation in its pursuit.  The balance of power in this relationship must always tilt 
towards civilian control, as the fall of numerous great powers, from the Assyrians 




III. U.S. MILITARY INNOVATION IN THE AGE OF THE 
UNTHINKABLE209 
A. LESSONS FROM HISTORY APPLIED TO AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 
The ancient Egyptians, Greeks and Romans each provide lessons for the 
current U.S. military.  These three vibrant societies built militaries to protect the 
civilization they had created.  As the Akkadians, Assyrians and Persians 
developed administrative structures to facilitate their military power, they both 
innovated organizational techniques and highlighted the weak cultural 
foundations on which this innovation was built.  The persistent powers—
especially Ancient Egypt, Athens, and China—were those with resilient 
civilizations.  Those were the civilizations that, even when sovereignty was lost, 
the civilization persisted.  Even more prescient for the modern U.S. military is the 
revelation that the most successful power maintainers were those that built upon 
the soft and hard power components described above, and created from it a 
feedback loop—where the innovativeness of society directly supported the 
innovativeness of the military.  In return, the innovative military protected, 
expanded, and diffused innovation to the society.  China from the Han Dynasty to 
the modern era is the archetypal case of this feedback loop.  In twenty-first 
century America, this means that it is no longer enough for the military to be 
innovative while standing separate from the society.  In maintaining global power, 
the U.S. military must foster and adapt its innovation from the society that it 
protects—taking the best technological innovations from society, and adapting 
doctrine and organizations to maximize their use.  The U.S. military has made 
headway in this area during the last ten years of conflict, now more widely using 
commercial off-the-shelf technology and information systems to its advantage, 
but this trend should increase as the military begins adapting organizations and 
doctrine to maximize the available technology.  Yet, the military is not a passive 
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actor in this feedback loop, either.  The U.S. military must continue to diffuse 
innovation to the American society, as it did with the Internet in the 1980s and it 
continues to do with medical advances learned in combat today, to sustain the 
innovative cycle.  Advanced education for military leaders in civilian institutions is 
a first step to creating the networks between the military and society that would 
foster this cycle. 
If the Ancient Era is illustrative of the need to foster an innovative cycle 
between society and the military, the Medieval Era displays the interplay of 
military might and diplomacy.  The Chinese first successfully subordinated 
military power to civilian administration, realizing the value of a standing 
professionalized force, controlled and deployed by a non-military leader.  The 
Byzantine Empire first translated this authority into successful diplomacy—using 
military strength as a deterrent and the threat of force as a diplomatic tool.  The 
Byzantine Empire also proved the perils of a sclerotic bureaucratic and military 
system that again reinforced the need to innovate.  The bureaucracy and 
demonstrated ability of the Byzantine military is what allowed this empire to rise 
to power out of the Roman Empire.  However, the organization that proved 
successful in gaining the empire great power, proved ultimately responsible for 
its power decline.  A bureaucracy and military that fails to innovate, even with the 
best intentions of protecting the state, can directly cause the downfall of the 
power it seeks to protect.  The lessons for the current U.S. military are two-fold.  
First, the military is ultimately subordinate to and in support of America‘s foreign 
policy.  Any demonstrated strength and capability should be for the purpose of 
future diplomatic influence, rather than to justify the existence and expenses of 
the military.  Second, no matter how efficient and effective the bureaucracy and 
military are that allow a state to gain power, they must innovate to maintain that 
power.  The U.S. military of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries defeated the 
world domination aspirations of fascism and communism, while maintaining a 
liberal democracy at home.  That same structure will not suffice to defeat the  
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world domination aspirations of jihadism, or the unknowable threats of the future.  
The U.S. military must constantly innovate in order to maintain the power status it 
so dutifully earned in previous centuries. 
The First Period of Globalization provides examples of the importance of 
national wealth to defense.  In this era, states begin to view their militaries as 
means with which to gain more money.  Yet, there are cautionary tales from this 
era for the U.S. military, as well.  As powers sent their militaries to the far corners 
of the globe, these militaries had varying success in garnering wealth and power 
for their country.  Powers that were able to continue expansion, such as Britain 
and France, maintained power through this period and into the next.  However, 
powers whose military were spread to distant lands, but retained centralized 
control, lost power and dissolved.  Countries that deploy troops to distant lands 
must be able to decentralize control of those troops.  Otherwise, the costs of 
maintaining those dispersed troops under centralized control can cause the 
collapse of the state system.  When America deploys it troops to distant lands in 
operations that should directly support its coherent foreign policy, it must resist 
the temptation that technology offers to maintain rigid control of those troops.  
Instead, the National Command Authority must have the confidence in its 
professionalized military to execute those distant operations in the proper 
manner.   Also, the case of the small city-state of Siena provides a harbinger of 
great powers in the following era.  This Italian city-state spends so much on the 
construction of a trace italienne that it bankrupts itself.  In the next period of 
globalization, great powers did the same on a larger scale.  The U.S. military 
must always remember that its purpose is to protect the United States.  If the 
organization becomes so bloated and expensive that it bankrupts the very 
system it was designed to protect, then it has failed in its mission. 
In the Second Period of Globalization, the trend of economic preeminence 
continues to rise.  Global powers, such as Britain and France, are able to 
maintain their power only through the codification of great power status in the 
United Nations Security Council and their own alliance formation.  Yet, their 
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empires collapse as rebellions for independence match the powers‘ technological 
superiority with doctrinal superiority in irregular warfare.  The development of 
nuclear weapons reshapes the very nature of warfare, as power and diplomacy 
are determined by possession of one specific technology.  At the end of this 
period, three new powers emerged with varying military capability:  China, 
Germany and Japan.  China has a huge land army, but little naval or air 
capability for power projection.  However, its economic centrality to the rest of the 
world makes it a global power on par, or ahead of, countries with much more 
capable militaries.  Germany and Japan also become great powers, with very 
little military capability—and possibly because of it.  Many argue that the 
economic and innovation dominance of Japan is precisely because it does not 
have to spend money on military might.  The U.S. military must remember that 
however dominant it might be today, it is only one component of U.S. power.  
The U.S. military must also remember that technological innovation can provide a 
distinct advantage in combat, but that, just as the Matabele‘s negated the 
effectiveness of the British Maxim Gun, technological superiority can be 
overcome by irregular tactics.  Only when technology is coupled with adaptable 
doctrine and executed by an organization structured to optimize its effectiveness, 
will it be truly decisive. 
Most importantly, from the Second Period of Globalization, the U.S. 
military must heed the warning of pre-war Germany and Japan and the 1980s-
era Soviet Union.  If the military expands its role into policy formulation based on 
past successes, and uses this elevated position to justify future spending, it runs 
the risk of disrupting the civil-military balance.  The U.S. military must continue to 
innovate in support of a coherent national strategy that guides this innovation.  It 
must also accept the reality of constrained resourcing in support of larger 
national power.  A military that continues to innovate in the absence of a national 
strategy, or in spite of civilian control of this innovation risks upsetting the 
balance that keeps militarism in check.  It also runs the risk of outspending the 
country that it seeks to protect, and contributing to its downfall. 
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B. THE CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
The Information Age is truly a period in history like no other.  However, the 
historical record is replete with ‗periods like no other.‘  The invasion of ancient 
Egypt by the ‗seapeoples‘ or the massive destruction caused by industrial-era 
weapons meeting Napoleonic tactics in World War I, were no less disconcerting 
to societies of those ages than the concept of cyberterrorism is to today‘s 
societies.  To say that world in the twenty-first century  is complex is both jejune 
and trite.  In the ‗age of the unthinkable‘ national and military leaders must make 
decisions and take actions to reduce that complexity where they are able, and 
embrace and prepare for it where they are unable.  Innovations in organizational 
structure, doctrine and technology are all in the ‗realm of the controllable‘ for 
military leaders; the nature of evolving threats or the timing and placement of 
their attacks are mostly unknowable.  All that military leaders can do for the latter 
is to adjust the former to be resilient, adaptable, and capable to meet and defeat 
them.  This innovation must take place in a resource-constrained environment.  
The good news is that resource constraints and innovation may be 
complementary rather than at odds. 
Joshua Cooper Ramo, in The Age of the Unthinkable, describes the world 
as a sand pile.  His analogy rests on the experiments of physicist Per Bak, who 
measured how sand piles, as complex adaptive systems, adjusted to each new 
variable, or grain of sand, that was dropped onto them.  Ramo explains that, like 
the sand pile, the world is a complex adaptive system that readjusts with every 
variable.210  Yet, sometimes in the interconnected global system, also like the 
sand pile, an adjustment is not possible and part or all of the system collapses.  
The lesson in this experiment is that the U.S. military cannot predict all the 
threats of the future.  As such, there is no way to design the perfect military to 
meet those unknowable threats.  Instead, military leaders must design a military  
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system that allows innovation, both from within and externally, to create 
maximum adaptability.  ―History is a series of strategic surprises.‖ 211  A military‘s 
capability is in its ability to adapt to them. 
Although the exact future security environment is unknowable, one can 
deduce certain trends from the past and current environment.  One school of 
thought is the abundance-scarcity paradox, which states that information, 
connections and ‗recipes‘ will be abundant, while strategic resources (energy, 
land, food and atmospheric space for emissions), institutional capacity to handle 
trans-boundary risks and time will be scarce.  The abundant resources are 
products of the information age, with the term ‗recipes‘ referring to the, 
―instructions for arranging resources to achieve a defined end.‖212  The scarcity 
in geographic resources is a persistent theme throughout history, the scarcity for 
time is a newer revelation—as information, connections and recipes are more 
abundant, the competition for mindshare to deal with this abundance becomes a 
scarcity of its own.  This last concept can be a predictor of future conflict:  as 
information abundance raises the expectations of a growing population that do 
not have the resources to meet expectations, conflicts will increase.213  This 
requires a shift in thinking from national interests (an inherently zero-sum 
mindset) to collective security, however broadly defined. 
The final trends in the current and future international system are the 
transitions of power.  Power is currently transitioning from West to East in the 
international state system while, simultaneously, power is also diffusing from 
states to non-state actors—from the few to the many.214  The power shift from 
West to East is caused by the reemergence of China, rising powers such as India 
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and South Korea, and other countries economically catching up from the gap 
created by the industrial revolution.  The power diffusion from states to non-state 
actors is a result of technological innovations in the information age that enable 
‗the many‘ to wield great influence.  ―We need a new narrative if we are to 
understand power in the twenty-first century.  Its not whose army wins, but 
whose story wins.‖215  The cause of the Peloponnesian War was the rise in the 
power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta.  The greatest danger the 
United States has in managing these two power transitions in the twenty-first 
century is fear—because fear can cause an overreaction that leads to war.216    
C. A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE AGE OF 
TRANSPARENCY217 
In a future defined by abundant information, scarce resources, and shifting 
and diffusing power, the United States needs a new national strategy.  From the 
soft power of ancient Egypt and Athens to Ronald Reagan‘s concept of a ‗shining 
city upon a hill,‘ powers that defined their strategy in terms of what they stood for, 
rather than what they were against, have been successful in defeating 
challengers and maintaining that power.  Two values that the United States 
should build its strategy on are security and prosperity.218  These values are 
universal enough to elicit the support of U.S. society and understood broadly 
enough to obtain allies rather than enemies.  In the future world of abundant 
information, scare resources and the expectation gap that this creates, the 
United States must adopt a broader view of security while understanding that its 
prosperity is inextricably linked to that of other nations.  From a realist 
perspective, this statement of strategy is aimed at America‘s two rising 
challengers—the threat of a modernizing Chinese military and the irregular threat 
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of terrorist organizations and other non-state actors—by professing a ‗story‘ of 
American power that is more inclusive and benign than its enemies‘ ‗story.‘  From 
an idealist point of view, this statement of a strategy for security and prosperity 
allows the United States to align its interests with it values so that pursuit of one 
is not in conflict to the other.  ―All states have a grand strategy, whether they 
know it or not.  That is inevitable because grand strategy is simply the level at 
which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern terms intelligence and diplomacy, 
interact with military strength to determine outcomes in a world of other states, 
with their own ‗grand strategies.‘‖219   
The United States has a grand strategy, which it implicitly forwards every 
time it deploys its military in support of its interests.  Its failure is in effectively 
expressing this strategy globally and in aligning its interests and values to that 
strategy.  The values of security and prosperity were evident in Washington‘s 
support for the Egyptian democratic protestors in early 2011.  However, these 
values came into direct conflict with the past U.S. interests that supported Hosni 
Mubarak for decades.  The support for the latter was largely based on the U.S. 
fear of Islamic extremism and its threat to Israel, and provides an example of the 
failure inherent in defining a country‘s strategy in terms of what the country is 
against.220  In a similar case, the United States has isolated Iran—refusing to 
deal with it diplomatically and economically, even disallowing private interaction.  
The costs of this refusal to engage are felt in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
Washington is trying to forge political and economic stability, while completely 
isolating the largest power in the region.221  Finally, there is a certain simplicity in 
developing a national strategy based upon a country‘s values rather than focused 
on its threats:  in a future security environment of unknown threats, a coherent 
strategy based on the latter is wholly impossible. 
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It is not within the scope of this study to write a new national strategy, but 
only to highlight its usefulness in shaping the U.S. military for the future.  A 
clearly defined strategy would allow military leaders to ‗nest‘ their innovations into 
a higher-level concept, so that an innovation‘s effectiveness could be measured 
by both military and national leaders.  The absence of this clearly defined 
strategy keeps military leaders pursuing change in their own right—either along 
their personal belief of the ‗right‘, or parochial budgetary fights that stifle 
innovation—the engines of institutional inertia.  ―All states must have a grand 
strategy, but not all grand strategies are equal.  There is coherence and 
effectiveness when persuasion and force are each well guided by accurate 
intelligence, and then combine synergistically to generate maximum power from 
available resources.  More often, perhaps, there is incoherence so that the fruits 
of persuasion are undone by misguided force, or the hard-won results of force 
are spoiled by clumsy diplomacy that antagonizes neutrals, emboldens enemies, 
and disheartens allies.‖222  America must ensure that its grand strategy is clearly 
articulated, then align its diplomatic, military and development power in support 
of that grand strategy. 
D. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT AND 
DEFENSE TO FOSTER INNOVATION 
With a national strategy that broadly defines security and prosperity for an 
interconnected global environment, the U.S. Department of Defense should no 
longer be the face of America to the world.  Security should no longer be even a 
‗whole-of-government‘ approach, but rather a ‗whole-of-society‘ one, in which the 
military plays an integral, but lesser role.  This transformation begins at the 
diplomatic level with a strengthening of existing multilateral alliances, such as 
NATO, and a pursuit of new multilateral alliances, such as ASEAN.223  In this 
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diplomatic initiative, the United States should seek to transform the ‗entangling 
web‘ of bilateral alliances that it maintains, especially in Asia, in favor of 
multilateral ones that pursue collective security and burden sharing.  However, 
this approach is not completely idealistic.  In maintaining national power through 
multilateral alliances, the strategy should focus particularly on partnership 
organizations, or as a last resort, individual countries that posses a 
complementary strength to U.S. power.  For example, NATO and the EU 
militaries possess specific competence in nation-building activities, which the 
United States lacks.  Likewise, the ASEAN nations, through a cooperative 
relationship could begin taking responsibility for some of the Asian sea lines of 
communication, in order to free the U.S. Navy from this burden.  In pursuing this 
course, the United States should also support a restructuring of the United 
Nations Security Council.  The five permanent members have assured their own 
status as great powers, while the reality of the global power structure may not 
support their claim.  A more objective selection of permanent membership may 
include newer powers such as India, Japan or Germany.  Of course, France and 
Britain would be increasingly wary of this objective selection, but may be afforded 
the compromise of a permanent seat for the European Union.  Regardless of the 
diplomatic intricacies involved, if the Security Council remains unchanged, any 
future attempt to wield the power of the United Nations will be thwarted by its 
arcane adherence to a post-World War II power structure.   
In line with a new national strategy for security and prosperity, the United 
States must signal the world of this shift from a military outlook to a diplomatic 
one with the transformation of our Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) to 
Regional Interest Directorates (RIDs).  The regional interest directorates would 
be under the direction of a civilian, not a uniformed military flag officer.  This 
civilian would be a presidential appointee, most likely coming from a foreign 
service, military or intelligence background, but would report directly to the 
President.  By having these directors, and a majority of their directorate, not in 
uniform, the United States can reduce the perception of a global empire, while 
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they work to build relationships and capacity with partnered nations through the 
existing embassy structure—not despite it.  These RIDs would transition in place 
with the current GCCs, and would initially remain staffed with a large military 
component that currently exists.  A significant military component would remain 
in the RIDs, but would be only one part of the diplomacy, development, defense 
triad that should make equal parts of these future RIDs.  For far too long, the 
United States has claimed that it is not a global empire, while simultaneously 
carving up the world and placing it under the purview of military leaders.  The 
United States can maintain its military power, and increase its national power, by 
changing the face of its organizations for global interests from a uniformed one to 
a civilian one that truly seeks diplomacy, development, and defense interests. 
To further substantiate this transformation, the Pentagon should become 
the Executive Office Building.  While some have called for a complete shutdown 
of the Pentagon—―[t]hat five-sided structure is the bastion of hierarchy, of old 
ways of thinking and acting‖224—in an age of constrained resources, a 
repurposing of the building is more cost effective.  In line with the new national 
strategy that defines American values and transforms our geographic command 
military face to a regional interest civilian one, the Pentagon could serve as the 
locus of an interagency and whole of government approach to foreign relations.  
If the secretaries of each of the key executive departments share the same 
building, surely cooperation and horizontal innovation will result.225  The five 
sides of the Pentagon could hold one each of the:  Department of Internal 
Security (a combination of the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice), 
Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Development 
(formerly the U.S. Agency for International Development, now as a full executive 
department), and Department of Intelligence (the current intelligence community 
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under the Director of National Intelligence).  This combining of all the 
departments in one building should have multiple positive effects, two among 
them are the reduction in the bureaucratic structures that have grown unabated 
in each one of these departments over the years, and the reduction of 
redundancies between departmental functions.  In the case of all departments, 
many of the functions done in Washington today should be pushed out ‗to the 
field.‘  The creation of RIDs that integrate diplomacy, development, and defense 
would assume many of these functions pushed out from the currently bloated 
Washington bureaucracies.  The potential for reducing redundancies is best 
highlighted by the Department of Intelligence.  Each department (State, Defense, 
and Homeland Security) has a large intelligence component to support their own 
interests.  Combining the departments in one building in Washington would 
surely highlight these redundancies and allow for true whole-of-government 
consolidation of functions.  In this, and many unforeseen ways, combining most 
of the executive departments in the Pentagon, while pushing the functions out to 
RID locations reduces redundancies both vertically and horizontally, makes more 
synergistic organizations, and reduces costs. 
The final, and arguably most potent, structural change that would force 
departmental integration is funding.  A pooled funding approach must be 
instituted to force departments to work with one another.  A model already exists 
for this type of funding approach.  The Section 1206 funding model institutes a 
dual-key approach to foreign military assistance, with proposals for missions 
generated by either the GCCs or the embassy country teams.  Proposals for 
funding are then routed either through State or Defense channels and must 
receive both SECDEF and SECSTATE approval prior to execution.226  
Expansion of this concept and inclusion of the RID transformation only makes 
this funding model more practical.  The RID Director would vet funding requests 
that were then processed by the Executive Office Building (the Pentagon).  
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Concurrence by the three department secretaries (State, Defense, and 
Development) should be facilitated by their location within the same building.  
From another monetary point-of-view, the government must change the way it 
spends money—from the end-of-year ‗spending sprees‘ to a more market-based 
approach.  The priorities for this market-based spending would be set by the 
national strategy and execution of that strategy by RID Directors.  More 
intuitively, departments and organizations have to lose the ‗spend it or lose it‘ 
attitude that currently pervades government spending—it is completely 
antithetical to saving money in a resource-constrained environment.  Instead, a 
market-based government spending approach would reward departments and 
organizations that save money and streamline processes with more ‗profits.‘  In 
this way, efficient organizations, rather than large ones, will be rewarded with 
more money. 
The three structural changes proposed above are designed to impel the 
integration of the military into the broader interagency and whole-of-government 
power structure.  As the lessons of great powers in history prove, not only must 
integration occur between the civilian and military leadership of a country, but 
also among the various forms of national power in order to capitalize on the 
strength of the country.  By changing the ‗face‘ of American foreign policy from a 
military one to civilian one, with the institution of regional interest directorates to 
replace geographical combatant commands, the United States would 
demonstrate the preeminence of diplomacy over force.  By forcing the Pentagon 
to assimilate all the departments involved in American diplomacy, defense and 
development, the United States could create synergy, reduce personnel and 
allow for more innovative organizations with less bureaucratic overhead.  Finally, 
by pooling the monies that resource each department, the administration could 
cut costs by reducing redundancies, and, more importantly use funding to ensure 
alignment of the actions of each department with the national strategy. 
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E. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE:  REDUCING REDUNDANCIES, 
MAXIMIZING CAPABILITIES, AND CREATING RESILIENCY 
THROUGH TECHNOLOGY-STRATEGY INTEGRATION AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 
The U.S. military is currently the uncontested technological leader in 
warfare.  This technological innovation needs to continue through the 
sponsorship of R&D on a market-based purchasing system versus the pay-to-
build system that currently exists.  This transformation will have limits—a private 
company cannot expect to front the costs for R&D of large systems, such as a 
new jet fighter aircraft, and may require seed money from government funding to 
do so.  However, the pay-to-build system has become the rule rather than the 
exception, with government contracting companies assuming relatively little risk 
and reaping huge profits.227  This system, like government spending in general, 
needs to transform to a more market-based approach.  Innovation, especially in 
technology, will be enhanced by the competition created from market-based 
purchasing by the military.  This continued technological development will face 
two crucial questions in the future:  what is the right mix of quantity versus 
quality, and how do we avoid letting our technological ability to kill outpace the 
ethical thinking about that ability.228   
As the French before World War II serve as a reminder that technology 
alone does not make military might, the U.S. military must continually adapt this 
new technology to doctrines and organizational structures that maximizes its use.  
Although the U.S. military remains the unparalleled technological leader in the 
world, it applies new technologies to doctrine and organizations that have not 
changed since World War II.  In the army, corps and division structures still exist 
and create burdensome bureaucratic overhead, even as the organization has 
begun transitioning to the brigade combat team as the primary fighting element 
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on the battlefield.  In the navy, the aircraft carrier remains the capital ship, 
leading to air combat operations flown from aircraft carriers instead of more 
convenient land bases, only to justify the existence of the carrier.229  The air 
force touts integration, but remains focused on strategic bombing as its core 
value instead of close air support.  The U.S. military of the twenty-first century 
must eschew the model of the pre-World War II French military—adopting a 
defensive doctrine, building the Maginot Line to support it, and haphazardly 
applying the technological innovations of tanks to existing organizations.  
Instead, the U.S. military should more closely follow the innovation of pre-World 
War II Germany—realizing the importance and potential of new technologies to 
support a nested military strategy by adapting doctrine and organizations to 
maximize their use.  The first stage of this transformation is the civil-military 
integration described above in a coherent national strategy and a whole-of-
government integration to guide military innovation.  Britain in the nineteenth 
century provides a good example of this grand strategy, with integration of naval 
and land forces to simultaneously balance threats on the European continent and 
expand its empire.  The next step happens at the military level.  The horizontal 
integration must occur between the U.S. services, such as the integration 
between the German ground and air forces in blitzkrieg doctrine. 
In pursuing ‗jointness,‘ the U.S. military must embrace a paradox:  it must 
continue to facilitate cooperation between the services, while maintaining varied 
capabilities to prevent ‗unifiedness.‘   Unifiedness occurs when multiple services 
apply huge bureaucratic overheads to relatively small mission sets, so that 
‗everyone gets to play.‘230  This has often been the case in recent joint 
operations, especially combat operations, and has created a dilution of the 
distinction between mission sets.  An unintended consequence of efforts to force 
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joint integration, is a blending of roles and missions that has created more 
redundancy rather than less.  Instead, the U.S. military needs to integrate the 
capabilities of the joint services by adjusting forces to the proper place on the 
attrition/relational-maneuver spectrum.231  Each service component and specialty 
within those services were created out of a perceived need to function along this 
spectrum—the army air corps of World War II was at the attritional end of the 
spectrum, while the psychological operations branch of the army was created to 
fill a gap on the relational-maneuver end.  Yet, as threats and combat scenarios 
have changed, services have either tried to wrongly apply their end of the 
spectrum to the problem at hand (‗Shock and Awe‘ bombing campaign in 2003) 
or unilaterally shifted their mission set to get into the fight (Navy SEALs 
conducting village stability operations in Afghanistan).  The natural tendency for 
individuals and organizations alike is to converge on the problem at hand.232  By 
clearly delineating roles and missions for each service and the specialties within 
that service, the U.S. military will create a range of capabilities that will make it 
uniquely resilient in meeting the unknowable threats of the future.  But this 
delineation requires forcing mechanisms, ―…military organizations will seldom 
innovate autonomously, particularly in matters of doctrine.  This should be true 
because organizations abhor uncertainty, and changes in traditional patterns 
always involve uncertainty.  It should also be true because military organizations 
are very hierarchical, restricting the flow of ideas from the lower levels to the 
higher levels.  Additionally, those at the top of the hierarchy, who have achieved 
their rank and position by mastering the old doctrine, have no interest in 
encouraging their own obsolescence by bringing in a new doctrine.‖233  In order 
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for U.S. military to innovate towards a resilient organization for the future, it must 
adapt its organizational structures, not only to meet the current threats, but also 
to diversify capabilities to meet the unknowable threats of the future.  It must then 
break the bureaucratic structure that stifles innovation to allow for the rise of 
innovative leaders.   
1. Army 
The U.S. Army, as the largest component of the U.S. military, can also 
provide the majority of cuts to manpower.  Personnel costs are the second 
largest portion of the Department of Defense budget.234  Therefore, reducing 
total personnel numbers is a cost-saving endeavor.  The primary target for these 
reductions are the heavy armored and artillery forces that have spent most of the 
last decade protecting convoys and conducting other missions outside of their 
function specialties.  As a hedge against rising peer competitors—and assuming 
that some in the army still wish to fight old-style opponents in old-styled ways—
these forces should transfer to the reserve component, where the capability is 
maintained in the event of a large-scale war but at a fraction of the cost.235  This 
transfer of heavy forces to the Reserve component can take place as combat 
teams are transitioned from brigade to battalion level.  The brigade combat team 
modernization of the army is a good first step towards decentralizing units to fight 
in a more dispersed manner.  Now the army must take the next step and 
transition these self-sustaining units to the battalion level.  This would create 
three times as many maneuver elements within the army while reducing the total 
force structure.  In addition, now that the transformation to the brigade combat 
team is complete, and the continued transformation to the battalion combat team 
should begin, the corps and division structures in the army should disappear.  
The concept of a ‗fighting general‘ as in World War II, should never occur 
                                            
234 Department of Defense, ―FY2010 Department of Defense Budget:  Total Obligation 
Authority, Budget Authority, and Outlays,‖ accessed at http://comptroller.defense.gov on May 25, 
2011. 
235 Arquilla, Worst Enemy, 210. 
 112 
again,236 as the army maximizes the capability of technology and decentralizes 
maneuver operations to wise and seasoned lieutenant colonels and colonels.  
This depth of experience at a lower rank structure would be facilitated by the 
personnel system outlined below.  General officers, in this system, would no 
longer be considered commanders; instead, they become the managers of the 
army with the colonels and their maneuver units as its center of gravity. 
In the dissolution of the corps and division structures altogether and the 
transition from brigade combat teams to battalion combat teams, units can return 
to their core competencies to provide the maximum variety of capabilities.  
Limited battalions would maintain an airborne capability, as this specialty is 
resident in the 75th Ranger Regiment, and any denied airfield seizure will be 
conducted by the latter.  This smaller combat team also allows more diversity in 
capability.  The field artillery units that have been protecting convoy operations in 
Iraq for the last eight years, can transition to a counter-insurgency support 
force—translating the institutional knowledge gained in combat operations into 
doctrinal innovation for real capabilities necessary for the future.  The army‘s 
advise and assist brigade combat teams can transition to multiple advise and 
assist battalion combat teams.  These units are an example of the capability 
diversification necessary to building a resilient army for the future.  A 
constabulary force of National Guard units can augment these specialized units.  
The National Guard units receive real-world experience in responding to natural 
disasters within their home states, which makes them uniquely suited to fill this 
role as a post-conflict constabulary force.  There should also be a formal network 
for training and employment established between advise and assist active units, 
constabulary force National Guard units, and U.S. partners who possess 
institutional knowledge in both of these missions, such as the United Kingdom.  
The limited number of heavy units that should remain in the active force should  
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return to their core competencies, providing a capability that can fill the gap in 
future conflicts until the mobilization of the heavy forces from the Reserve 
component can occur.   
2. Navy 
The Navy must come to the realization that the aircraft carrier should no 
longer be its capital ship.  This study does not argue for the elimination of the 
aircraft carrier, but rather a transition to its being a lesser part of the greater 
whole.  The aircraft carrier provides both a real military capability and a 
diplomatic one.  Few diplomatic gestures are as strong or clearly understood 
throughout the world as sending a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle group into an 
area—even if its deterrent record is poor, with failures such as Korea in 1950, 
Vietnam in 1965, Lebanon in 1982 and Kuwait in 1990.  Yet, still no ship in the 
U.S. arsenal has this diplomatic power, and in the context of military power 
always supporting diplomatic power, this capability should remain.  From a purely 
military standpoint, the aircraft carrier does offer the capability of power 
projection through air superiority in a self-contained package that the air force 
and smaller ships cannot fulfill.  The aircraft carrier still possesses a vital role in 
the U.S. arsenal. 
Submarines are also an important weapon in the U.S. arsenal, providing 
surreptitious capability for force projection and weapons employment.  However, 
in an age of increased cooperation and the need for transparency in U.S. foreign 
policy, the submarine should also not be the capital ship of the navy.  The 
perception of submarines as the ‗silent force‘ is in contrast to a U.S. strategy of 
transparency and cooperation.  These assets are integral to maintain within the 
navy, but their designation as the capital ship undermines the diplomatic primacy 
of foreign policy.  Instead, the amphibious assault ship should become the capital 
ship for the U.S. Navy, offering more ‗maneuver units‘ at a lower cost.  The 
amphib offers the U.S. Navy enough power projection to control sea-lines of 
communication and conduct military diplomacy at a fraction of the cost of an 
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aircraft carrier.  In addition, it provides a diverse capability—tailorable to the 
needs of the mission without the overhead costs inherent in a huge carrier.  In an 
era of maximizing diverse capabilities while minimizing costs, the amphib should 
become the capital ship of the U.S. Navy. 
3. Air Force 
The air force should transition strategic bombing to the Reserve 
component.  As with the army‘s heavy units, the possibility of needing this 
capability for large-scale conflict in the future is low, while the timeline for their 
employment is long.  The capability‘s focus on major combat operations makes it 
ideally suited for the Reserve component.  The active air force should refocus on 
close air support and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
activities in support of irregular warfare.  The latter of these priorities, ISR, has 
already begun transition to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), while the 
possibilities for this technology to drastically change doctrine has only begun to 
be realized.  The advantage that the United States possesses in UAV technology 
should be leveraged to its fullest; its only block to full acceptance being the 
parochialism of the service thus far.  This technology offers possibilities in 
innovation of doctrine and organizations for the U.S. Air Force that exceed any 
other current singular technology.  The ethical issues of ‗computer-game warfare‘ 
require that a human remain in the decision loop for lethal technologies in the 
foreseeable future.237  However, the potential to reduce personnel in the air force 
through the maximum employment of UAV technology and the transition of 
strategic bombing to the Reserve component remains high. 
4. Marines 
The Marine Corps should return to its core mission set as the global quick 
reaction force.  One reason that the Marine Corps remains under the Department 
of the Navy is that the former was never meant to become a second land force.  
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The Marine Corps, as the smallest service component of the Department of 
Defense, has consistently proven its ability to ‗punch above its weight.‘  This 
organization should maintain this focus and pull out of commitments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq that have relegated it to a second army force.  Instead, 
when the army becomes involved in sustained operations, such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the Marine Corps must remain externally focused—able to support 
national security objectives and diplomacy in areas where engagements are 
more fluid.  Its interventions in these areas must remain short-duration, as the 
organization is optimized to conduct. As with the army, the marines are able to 
transition much of their heavy armor and artillery to the Reserve component for 
the same reasons outlined above.  A smaller force and closer integration of joint 
capabilities would allow the marines to reduce the redundancies.  A foreign 
officer once said of marine aviation, ―I‘ll never understand your military—not only 
does your navy have an army, but your navy‘s army has an air force!‖238 
As the reference to the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual mentions 
above, the marines have a history and tradition steeped in irregular warfare.  As 
such, the military should maximize this institutional knowledge and allow the 
marines to take a broader role in foreign internal defense operations in support of 
U.S. foreign policy.  In these global quick reaction force and foreign internal 
defense missions, the Marine Corps could reduce personnel and equipment as it 
integrates with other services and special operations forces to reduce its size and 
increase its ability to innovate. 
5.  Special Operations 
The U.S. special operations force must remain small and selective, or it 
may risk losing its value altogether.  Some within the special operations 
community have parochially attempted to defend special operations‘ mission sets 
against the encroachment of other U.S. military units.  This argument is made by 
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those who would create stagnant bureaucracies and further the institutional 
inertia to inhibit innovation.  On the contrary, special operations should welcome 
and facilitate the diffusion of capabilities from their units to the general-purpose 
forces.  Technological and doctrinal innovations that are diffused to smaller 
decentralized units in the military who are able to fulfill that capability, only allows 
special operations forces to push further into innovative realms.  What has been 
termed ‗the laboratory role‘ for special operations, this ability to doctrinally 
innovate more quickly due to smaller size and less bureaucratic structure, must 
be maintained by a selective and agile special operations force.239 
As with the larger military, the roles and missions of special operations 
forces must be returned to their core competencies and adapted to the future 
security environment.  The current trend of U.S. Special Operations Command to 
refer to special operators as, ‗3-D Warriors:  defense, diplomacy, and 
development,‘ is an indication of mission drift and redundancy.  None of the 
service special operations units assess, select, or train their operators to be 
diplomats or developers.  Instead, 3-D Warriors reflect the catch-all nature of 
special operations to handle the missions that other government agencies are 
unable to.  The organizational resiliency that the military needs to foster to meet 
future unknowable threats, is not accomplished by diluting the mission sets of the 
capable, but by diversifying the capabilities of each element of the military, then 
placing those capabilities into the correct context to support national power.  ―A 
rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change and 
USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehensive enduring vision and 
supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and 
useful members of the joint team.‖240 
A second trend in the historical overview of military innovation in great 
powers is the need to integrate horizontally among military components.  Once a 
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great power achieves vertical integration of its grand strategy and military 
doctrine, it must assimilate the capabilities horizontally for maximum effect.  The 
French failed to accomplish this horizontal integration twice in its great power 
history—failing to match the continental strategy of the British in the First Period 
of Globalization and failing to integrate doctrine with technology across ground 
and air forces in the interwar period—both of which led to a loss of power.  The 
Germans, in the interwar period present a successful example.  Their integrated 
land and air power allowed for successful prosecution of blitzkrieg doctrine and 
maximized the power of the state.  The U.S. military must continue its transition 
towards ‗jointness‘ while ensuring it does not converge on ‗unifiedness.‘  In 
matching complementary capabilities, the U.S. military will not only achieve a 
synergistic effect to its military power, but also will be able to cut personnel and 
systems—a move necessary in a resource-constrained environment.  The 
recommended doctrinal and organizational changes above, allow for the 
dispersion of military capabilities to make the United States more resilient to the 
unknowable threats of the future.  However, the Byzantines, Ottomans and 
Germans proved that singular innovations are not sufficient for maintaining a 
nation‘s great power status.  A great power military must not view innovation as a 
goal or event, but rather as a process—it must create an innovative organization 
that continually adapts to the changing security environment. 
 
6. The U.S. Military Is Not a Meritocracy:  Structural Changes 
Needed to Create an Innovative Military  
As long as the U.S. military promotion system is rigidly based upon time in 
service, as it is now, the organization will not be a meritocracy.  Military 
organizations in history that employed a meritocracy system had an institutional 
ability to integrate innovative mindsets into their doctrine and strategy. In 
essence, this is an essential aspect of systemizing defense innovation. The 
Roman Empire and the Mongol Empire both represented very different types of 
meritocracies, but both allowed innovative leaders to rise in the ranks and create 
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some of the most innovative organizations in history.  A true meritocracy would 
allow leaders to promote the most promising soldiers and officers despite their 
inability to meet any time-in-service requirements.  The ‗year-group‘ promotion 
system codifies a rigid bureaucratic structure that ensures slow change and little 
innovation.  That this promotion system is centralized at the service 
headquarters—the U.S. Army‘s Human Resources Command determines the 
promotion of its more that half a million personnel—is further evidence of the 
extent of bureaucratic overhead.  In the doctrinal transition from larger-and-less 
maneuver units to smaller-and-more, discussed above, the military must lead 
with a personnel system that decentralizes decisions for promotion and 
leadership to lower commanders.  This departure from the year-group promotion 
system and centralized control will allow innovative leaders to move more rapidly 
through the ranks in a system that will always require rank and position to make 
drastic changes.  In line with this move from the year-group system, the military 
should adopt a general schedule-type pay system.  Positions in the military 
hierarchy would still have ranks, but each rank could have a step-system similar 
to civil servants.  This would shift the military promotion system from an ‗up-or-
out‘ paradigm to an expertise paradigm.  If a young officer does not want to 
compete for higher-level commands, but rather is content to stay in one job for 
five to seven years, he may continue to receive step-increase pay raises that 
reward his length of service, but allow him to build expertise in his job.  To 
support this decentralization, the military should also stop the three-year change 
of station process.  Longer assignments at duty stations will give leaders time to 
assess their subordinates more adequately and choose those that are deserving 
of promotion.  While not transforming the U.S. military completely to the British 
regimental system, the rotation between units would still fulfill the intent of the 
U.S. military to broaden the perspective of its officers and non-commissioned 
officers, while providing enough permanence at each station to allow job 
mastery.   
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While some may fear that this system could lead to perpetuating 
dysfunctional norms within a unit—a commander could promote and assign 
those leaders who adhere to his line of thinking—the information age will prevent 
this.  In an era of interconnected communications, operations, and information, 
the possibility of building an ‗enclave of dysfunction‘ is greatly reduced.  Peers 
and superiors alike will be able to self-police in an organization that will inherently 
remain hierarchical—and the future rating and evaluation system should include 
their perspectives, as well.  Others may contend that this system could allow a 
very young officer to rise to a level that outpaces his experience.  While the 
military is not, and never should be, a business, there is a business analogy in 
order here:  some of the most innovative businesses in America have relatively 
young CEOs.  Experience does not automatically translate to good leadership or 
vision, instead the most successful companies blend younger and older people at 
all levels of the hierarchy to maximize the value of experience while maintaining 
an innovative energy in the organization.  The potential costs of both of these 
arguments are outweighed by the benefits of a proposed promotion and 
command system that would break the monopoly for decision-making that age 
and experience in the military currently hold. 
The other method to ensure consistent innovation and break institutional 
inertia is education.  ―Education and selection of leaders are the heart of any 
country‘s long-term military capacity.‖241  While a general schedule-type pay and 
rank structure and an extended time on station period would provide more 
stability to military units and leaders, allowing them to stay in positions longer, the 
potential downfalls of making these organizations less fluid would be balanced by 
education.  The U.S. military must maximize the use of the best higher education 
system in the world that is resident in its country, as a direct measure to facilitate 
the social-military innovation loop.  The professional military education system, 
long a buttress of institutional inertia against change, should be reduced to the 
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basic levels of training and indoctrination necessary.  The current system does 
not educate, in the sense of pushing to students to think abstractly and broadly, it 
trains.  As such, it is taught at the most basic level further eroding the 
meritocracy of the military.  Professional military training should be reduced to 
basic officer training for the newly commissioned, and possibly one other training 
requirement at the company to field grade transition point.  These training 
opportunities should not be pass-or-fail as they are now, because this leads to a 
‗check the block‘ mentality among the students.  Instead, they should be 
competitive, with assignments and job opportunities based on performance.  
Outside of the basic level of training for officers and non-commissioned officers, 
education opportunities should be broadened and diversified through civilian 
institutions.  The innovative thought among military leaders will increase in 
proportion to the number of leaders that are educated in civilian schools.  Also 
resident in civilian education is the collaborative teaching method that the next 
generation of military recruits will seek.  In the information age, American society 
is moving towards an expectation of collaboration in decision making and 
information sharing (think Wikipedia).  The next generation of military recruits will 
expect to have a part in ‗the process.‘  In order for the military to maintain 
recruitment of the highest level performers, it must establish means for 
collaboration, while figuring out the limits of this collaboration—where can the 
organization create collaboration within a system that must retain a level of 
hierarchy.  Civilian education and an overhaul of professional military education 
system are necessary to bring the training and education standards of the 
military in line with the demands of the society from which it seeks to recruit. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
―American military power underwrote a world where people can even talk 
about soft power, and some people dwell on that term as if that underwriting by 
hard power does not and never did exist.‖242  Hard power has, and will always, 
play an integral role in national security.  From ancient Egypt to the present, 
civilizations have aligned hard and soft power to force their will upon others, to 
protect their culture against others, and to deter aggression.  Regardless of the 
civilization‘s values or form of government, certain truths about military and 
national power are consistent in the historical record.  States that successfully 
integrated their civil and military aims are able to gain power.  States that 
maintain this integration in a balance favoring civilian control and checking 
militarism are able to maintain power.  Militaries that innovate consistently within 
this construct are able to maintain their nation‘s power even longer.  Militaries 
that fail to innovate, or rely too heavily on one innovation at a point in time, 
ultimately fail and cause their nation to lose power.  The end to which a nation 
directs its military strength is based upon its values, and its ability to translate 
those values into a strategy to maximize its power.   
The United States needs a national strategy.  Yet, in the absence of this 
strategy and with a coming budgetary crisis, the Department of Defense has a 
choice.  It can either reshape itself in a model to make its country more secure 
and maintain its great power status, or it can continue to look for opportunity to 
fight for budget share.  The latter will take the decision out of civilian and 
uniformed military leadership and put it in the hands of Congress and the 
President.  The right choice is to reform to a system that fosters innovation and 
capability diversification, rather than waiting for an external entity to arbitrarily cut 
personnel or programs, while keeping the ineffective organizational models.  The  
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U.S. military must embrace the opportunities of the information age and accept 
the concept that, ―the future is not something to predict, it is something to 
achieve.‖243 
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